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PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS: IN UNITED STATES V.
SCOPO* THE SECOND CIRCUIT RAISES THE PRICE
OF A TRAFFIC TICKET (CONSIDERABLY)
INTRODUCTION
Over forty years ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson warned
that "[we must remember that the extent of every privilege of
search and seizure without a warrant which we sustain,...
[police] officers interpret and apply themselves and will push
to the limit."' Perhaps no other warrantless seizure provides a
more apt illustration of this proposition than a pretextual
arrest. A pretextual arrest occurs when a police officer makes
an arrest for a minor infraction in order to conduct a search
incident to that arrest.2 An arrest for a violation of a minor
19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994).
'Brinegar v. United States, 338 US. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 As used in this Comment, the term "pretextual arrest" refers to an instance
where a police officer makes an arrest for an ostensibly proper reason "but is in
fact arresting in order to conduct a search incident to arrest for which there is no
independent probable cause." John M Burkoff, Bad Faith Scarches, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 70, 78 n.36 (1982). As used herein, the term does not encompass "fabricated
pretexts," which purportedly occur when 'the government offers a justification [for
the arrest] that is not the true reason for the police activity and, in fact, is legal-
ly insufficient because it is not supported by the facts. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solv-
ing the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 1, 6 (1991). A
fabricated pretext occurs, for instance, when a police officer invents a traffic of-
fense after the fact to justify an arrest and subsequent search. The pretext doc-
trine does not apply under such circumstances because the arresting officer simply
lacks probable cause to make the arrest in the first place. United States v.
Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (Jones, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994). The lack of probable cause itself vitiates the arrest
and any authority to conduct a search incident to the arrest. See, James B.
Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 MICH. J. L.
REF. 639, 643 (1985).
This Comment also distinguishes between a pretextual stop and a pretextual
arrest. In the former situation, the police officer stops a vehicle after witnessing a
traffic infraction in order to observe the contents of the vehicle without searching
it. The stop may lead to an arrest if the officer observes contraband or if other
circumstances arise that justify an arrest. While a pretextual stop may be justified
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traffic law provides a classic pretext.3 In such a situation, the
officer suspects that the driver of a vehicle is engaged in illegal
activity, such as gun or drug possession, but does not have
probable cause to support an arrest for that offense. The officer
knows that a search of the vehicle is permissible if the driver
is arrested first.4 Thus, the officer arrests the driver for violat-
ing an infrequently enforced motor vehicle law in order to
search the car.
The constitutionality of pretextual arrests recently was
addressed by the Second Circuit in United States v. Scopo.'
Police arrested Ralph Scopo, brother of an alleged underboss of
the Colombo crime family ("Colombo Family") when he failed
to signal before changing lanes in his automobile.6 The police
officers, part of an undercover team formed for the purpose of
combatting a shooting war among factions of the Colombo
Family, were surveilling Scopo actively on the night of his
arrest.! After the arrest, they searched Scopo's car and recov-
ered a pistol.8 Accepting Scopo's argument that the officers ar-
rested him merely as a pretext to search his car, the district
court granted his motion to suppress the pistol. On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's order, reasoning
that an officer's motivation for making an arrest is irrelevant
to the constitutionality of the arrest and ensuing search.9
The issue the Second Circuit faced in Scopo is not novel.
Over the past decade, the federal circuit courts of appeals have
grappled with the problem of pretextual arrests and the proper
on the ground that it constitutes a minimal intrusion, a pretextual arrest is far
more intrusive and its reasonableness under the circumstances is therefore far less
evident.
' See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (a
"classic example [of a pretextual arrest] occurs when an officer stops a driver for a
minor traffic violation in order to investigate a hunch that the driver is engaged
in illegal... activity").
" In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court recog.
nized for the first time that police may search an individual without a warrant
following that person's arrest. For a discussion of the search-incident-to.arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement see infra part IA.
6 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994).
' United States v. Scopo, 814 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 19
F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994). The facts of Scopo are dis.
cussed more fully infra, text accompanying notes 66-75.
Id. at 294.
" Id. at 295.
Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784.
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standard to apply in evaluating their constitutionality.'" Unit-
ed States Supreme Court guidance in this area is far from
clear. Numerous Supreme Court cases suggest that pretextual
police activity is unconstitutional. Still, the Court has held a
wholly objective inquiry appropriate for determining the consti-
tutionality of searches and seizures, thus raising the ques-
tion of whether subjective motivation is ever relevant to deter-
mine pretext. In Scopo, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
"objective reasonableness" standard is the guiding principle for
all fourth amendment activity, including pretextual arrests.
The court found that the authority under state law to arrest
for minor traffic infractions makes those arrests objectively
reasonable and ends the inquiry for fourth amendment pur-
poses. In the wake of Scopo, pretextual traffic offense arrests
virtually are insulated from judicial review in the Second Cir-
cuit.
Although significant benefits to effective law enforcement
may accrue when police officers utilize motor vehicle statutes
creatively to arrest those who have committed more serious
crimes, 3 this Comment argues that the state interests served
"' The circuit courts of appeals are divided on this issue. See infra notes 81-82.
U See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
' See infra part LB.
"Proactive policing of this sort prevents the commission of crime. Police de-
partments in Indianapolis, Indiana and Kansas City, Missouri recently instituted
policies whereby police officers in high-crime areas routinely enforce minor infrac-
tions of the law, including traffic violations, in order to provide a legal basis to
search a car or pedestrian for illegal drugs or weapons. In Kansas City, at the
completion of a six-month trial period, gun-related crimes were reduced by almost
50%, and the number of homicides and drive-by shootings alo fell. No similar
reduction in crime was observed in areas not part of the pilot program. Addition-
ally, the use of special gun-intercept teams proved ten times more cost-effective
than regular police patrols in terms of gun-yield per hour of police patrol. Fox
Butterfield, Cities Finding A New Policy Limits Guns, N.Y. TIES, Nov. 20, 1994,
at 22. Moreover, it is not self-evident that the aggressive investigation of crime is
improper or deserves judicial or societal condemnation. Some argue that the police
have not only a right, but an affirmative duty, to arrest for a minor infraction in
order to conduct a search if the result is obtaining incriminating evidence that
otherwise could not have been lawfully obtained. See, e.g., State v. Blair, 691
S.W.2d 259, 264-5 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) ( I submit that the police had not only the
right but even the positive duty to obtain the defendant's fingerprints by any
lawful means. The defendant could be lawfully arrested on (a] traffic warrant, and,
having been arrested, was subject to search just as any other arrestee would be.")
(Blackmar, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub norm., Bissouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049
(1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987), overruled by State v. Mease, 842
1995]
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by enforcing traffic laws and even, in some instances, appre-
hending dangerous criminals in the process, are outweighed
substantially by the detrimental and intrusive nature of a
custodial arrest and search under such circumstances. Part I of
this Comment discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence relevant
to the law of pretextual traffic offense arrests. Bright-line rules
fashioned by the Court have expanded the scope of a permissi-
ble search incident to an arrest greatly, particularly the search
of an automobile. This expansion provides a powerful incentive
for police to arrest for violations of minor traffic laws in order
to conduct searches.14 Despite indications that the Court is
concerned with pretext, it has failed to defime either the con-
tours of its pretext doctrine or how that doctrine fits within the
general framework of an objective analysis of fourth amend-
ment activity. Accordingly, an inherent tension remains be-
tween the Court's pronouncements on pretext and its insis-
tence upon this wholly objective review.
Part II examines the district and circuit court opinions in
Scopo, focusing on how both courts interpreted and applied
Supreme Court precedent to fashion diametrically opposed
tests for determining the validity of pretextual arrests. Part III
examines the Second Circuit's decision in Scopo in further
detail, including the efficacy of the selective enforcement reme-
dy proposed by the concurring opinion. Part IV explores alter-
natives to the Second Circuit's approach that will curb
pretextual arrests more effectively. Finally, this Comment
concludes that while the Second Circuit in Scopo rendered a
principled reading of Supreme Court authority, it failed to
recognize fully the implications of its holding and to explore
alternative analyses that adequately address the concerns
raised by pretextual police activity.
I. SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY RELEVANT TO THE LAW OF
PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC OFFENSE ARRESTS
Three areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence relate to the
issue of pretextual arrests. First, during the past quarter cen-
tury, the Court has expanded broadly the permissible scope of
S.W.2d 98, 106 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
" See infra note 127.
[VCol. 61:453456
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warrantless searches incident to arrests. Second, in a number
of cases, the Court has indicated its concern that this expan-
sion provides police with an incentive to arrest solely for the
purpose of conducting a search. Lastly, the Court has fash-
ioned a wholly objective analysis for determining whether
fourth amendment activity is reasonable." Under this analy-
sis, courts must limit their review of police activity to objective
factors surrounding a search or seizure and cannot consider
the subjective motivations of an arresting officer. The Court
appears to have both opened the door to a review of pretextual
police activity with its decisions indicating that pretexts are
unconstitutional, and slammed it shut with its decisions pre-
cluding a review of an officer's intent. In short, the Supreme
Court has provided lower courts with inconsistent guidance in
this area.
A. The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception
A touchstone of fourth amendment jurisprudence is that
searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable,
"subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineat-
ed exceptions."16 One frequently invoked exception is that po-
lice contemporaneously may search both an arrestee and a
certain limited area within the arrestee's control." This pro-
cedure is known as a search incident to an arrest.'8 Searches
" The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
17 The Supreme Court established the authority to search a person incident to
a lawful arrest in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The Court
first recognized the authority to search the place where a person is arrested in
dicta in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
16 Besides a search incident to an arrest, the 'few established and %vell-delin-
eated exceptions" to the warrant requirement are: a limited post-arrest protective
sweep of the places at the site of an arrest where a person could hide, see Mary-
land v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); an inventory search of an impounded vehicle,
see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); a limited search to prevent the do-
struction of evidence, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); a seizure of evi-
dence discovered in plain view subsequent to the arrest of a suspect, cee Coolidge
19951
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incident to arrests serve two purposes. First, they permit ar-
resting officers to disarm suspects. This practice ensures
officers' safety while making an arrest, transporting the sus-
pect to the station house, and during the course of any at-
tempted escape. 9 Second, these searches prevent the suspect
from destroying evidence of the crime for which he or she has
been arrested.20
Although the Supreme Court has never questioned seri-
ously the necessity for searches incident to arrests, it has vacil-
lated in defining precisely the scope of the area that can be
searched and the principles justifying that scope.21 Defining
the scope of post-arrest searches has proven difficult for a
number of reasons. In theory, the safety rationale supports a
search of an arrestee's person under most, if not all, circum-
stances. Whether either the safety or destruction of evidence
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); a stop and frisk based upon reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); an
entry into a home and subsequent search of the premises when police are in "hot
pursuit" of a suspect, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); and a search of
an automobile upon probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, see
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). At least one commentator has noted
that the general requirement for a warrant has been virtually eviscerated by the
frequently-invoked exceptions. Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Ver-
sus 'Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. CT. REV. 127, 131
& n.19 (citing AJ..I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 157 (Proposed
Official Draft No. 1, 1972) (noting that warrantless searches have become the rule
rather than the exception and that in 1966, 171,288 arrests were made by New
York City police with only 3897 warrants obtained)).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
21 Id.
21 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (upholding seizure of
item not listed in warrant on grounds that subsequent to a lawful arrest, police
"had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place" of the
arrest); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932) (warrantless search
of premises unlawful despite fact that search contemporaneous to lawful arrest);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947) (warrantless search of entire
four-room apartment upheld as valid search incident to arrest), overruled by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 705 (1948) (warrantless search of distillery made incident to arrest held inval-
id where officers had opportunity prior to making arrest to obtain warrant), over-
ruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-63 (1950) (warrantless search of office incident to
arrest that extended for over one hour and included search of desk and file cabi-
nets upheld despite fact that officers had opportunity to secure search warrant
prior to arrest), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). These
cases and the evolution of the search-incident-to-arrest exception are discussed
fully in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-62 (1969).
(Vol. 61:453
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rationales support an area search, however, is not quite as
clear; the result may differ depending on the circumstances of
the arrest, including the crime involved, and the possibility
that the arrestee can access a weapon.
Because of the difficulties encountered by courts when
applying the search-incident-to-arrest exception to area search-
es involving automobiles, the Supreme Court established
bright-line rules that govern such searches.' These rules
greatly expand the police officer's latitude to conduct area
searches. Moreover, they are problematic theoretically because
their application does not depend on the actual existence of
either the safety or evidence concerns. Because courts do not
scrutinize these searches for either the probability of danger to
the officer or the likelihood that evidence will be destroyed,
this latitude provides a potential incentive for officers to arrest
solely in order to conduct searches.
1. "Bright Lines" and the Scope of a Search
Incident to an Arrest
In 1969, in Chimel v. California,' the Court appeared to
settle the issue of the proper scope of a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Relying on the safety and evidence rationales,
the Chimel Court permitted a post-arrest search of the arrest-
ee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control.24 In
Chimel, the Court established two principles regarding the
scope of a search incident to arrest: first, that specific purposes
' See infra part IlA.1.
2 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 762-63. In Chimel, police officers acting pursuant to an arrest warrant
arrested the defendant in his home for the burglary of a coin shop. Although they
did not have a search warrant, they conducted a post-arrest search of Chimers
entire three-bedroom home, including the insides of closed drawers. They seized a
number of coins which were later introduced as evidence at his trial Id. at 753-
54. The Supreme Court reversed Chimers burglary conviction. It found that the
safety and evidence concerns underlying the search incident to arrest exception
justify a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control,
or "'the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destruc-
tible evidence." Id. at 762-63. The Court found that no similar justification exists
for conducting a routine search of any room other than the one in which the sus-
pect is arrested or for searching closed drawers outside the reach of the arrestee
because there is no attendant danger to the officer and no possibility that the
suspect could destroy evidence. Id.
1995]
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are served in permitting such searches; and second, those pur-
poses define and limit the proper scope of such searches.
In subsequent decisions involving searches of automobiles,
however, the Court did not adhere to those principles. In two
post-Chimel decisions the Supreme Court replaced the ratio-
nale of Chimel, and its mandate of a case-by-case assessment
of the circumstances surrounding a search, with bright-line
rules governing the search of a person arrested in an automo-
bile and the search of an automobile incident to the arrest of
its occupant. These rules permit police to search fully both the
arrestee's person and the interior of the automobile.
In United States v. Robinson' the Court held that a full
search of an arrestee's person is per se reasonable and that the
scope of such a search is not restricted by the likelihood of
discovering either a weapon or evidence of the crime for which
the person was arrested." At issue in Robinson was a search
of the inside of a crumpled cigarette package discovered on
Robinson's person after police arrested him for driving without
a license. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the search was unconstitutional. That court reasoned
that because the officer could not have discovered evidence of
the traffic infraction in the cigarette package, he was limited to
conducting a protective search of Robinson to uncover weap-
ons.' The Supreme Court reversed.
The Robinson Court recognized that the need to disarm a
suspect in order to take him into custody justifies a search
incident to arrest as much as the need to preserve evidence.29
It rejected the assumption that persons arrested for traffic
violations are less likely to possess dangerous weapons than
those arrested for other crimes.3" It therefore declined to qual-
ify the breadth of the authority to search in traffic infraction
cases."' Instead, the Robinson Court held that all custodial
arrests are equivalent for purposes of search justification be-
cause the danger posed by extended contact with the arrestee
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
26 Id. at 234-35.
27 Id. at 223.
2 Id. at 227.
Id. at 234-35.
" Id. at 234.
" Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
[Vol. 61:453
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both on the scene and in transporting the arrestee to the police
station exists in all arrest situations.' Because the arrest in-
dependently justifies the search, the validity of the search does
not depend on a case-by-case assessment of the likelihood that
weapons or evidence would be found on the arrestee.' Accord-
ing to the Robinson Court, this bright-line rule accommodates
the needs of the arresting officer who must make a "quick ad
hoc judgment" of how and where to search the person of an
arrestee.Y
Although Chimel appeared to resolve the question of the
proper scope of a search of the place of arrest-as opposed to
the person of the arrestee-the Court revisited that issue in
1981 in the context of an automobile occupant's arrest. In New
York v. Belton, the Court declined to impose the limitations
established by Chimel to automobile searches.
In Belton, a state trooper stopped a vehicle for excessive
speeding. The officer detected the odor of marijuana and saw a
suspicious envelope on the floor of the car. He ordered the four
occupants out of the car and placed them under arrest for
possession of narcotics. After conducting pat-down searches of
all four men, the trooper placed them in separate areas of the
New York State Thruway, returned to the vehicle, and
searched four jackets lying on the back seat of the car. He
discovered cocaine in the zippered pocket of Belton's jacket.
The cocaine was admitted into evidence at Belton's trial and he
was convicted of possession of a controlled substance.
The New York Court of Appeals, applying Chimel, re-
versed the conviction. It found that the warrantless search of
the jackets could not be justified as a search incident to an
arrest because at the time of the search, none of the occupants
could have gained access to the jackets or their contents?'
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals,
holding that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contem-
poraneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger com-
Id. at 234-35.
3 Id. at 235.
"Id.





partment of that automobile."' The scope of this search in-
cludes the glove compartment and any other closed containers
or clothing within the automobile, whether or not such contain-
ers are capable of holding either a weapon or evidence of the
crime for which the person was arrested.
Underlying the Court's opinion in Belton was its concern
that the principles enunciated in Chimel are difficult to apply
in the context of automobile stops. The Court asserted that a
standard capable of ready application was essential to guide
police officers in their day-to-day activities.' The dissent, on
the other hand, characterized the Court's bright-line rule as
incorporating the "fiction... that the interior of a car is al-
ways within the immediate control of an arrestee who has
recently been in the car." 1
The Belton bright-line strictly limits review of the scope of
a post-arrest search of an automobile. If an arrest is lawful
and the search does not extend beyond the interior of the car,
a court will not review its scope. This rule raises a serious
concern that police officers might use the power to arrest for
the purpose of conducting a search and not for the purpose of
enforcing law." Without a requirement that police articulate
Id. at 460 & n.4.
'd.
" Id. at 458.
41 Belton, 453 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One commentator described the likely effect of Belton as follows:
After Belton, an officer who makes a lawful custodial arrest for a traffic
offense not only may remove and search any purse, wallet or crumpled
cigarette package that the arrestee is carrying; he also may search the
arrestee's car and luggage or other containers witbin it. The officer may
make this search simply to satisfy his curiosity, to pursue vague suspi-
cions, or even to harass. Belton gives anyone who drives an automobile
and cares about his privacy a new and powerful incentive to obey the
rules of the road.
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITr. L.
REV. 227, 281 (1984).
Commenting on the pros and cons of the bright-line trend of Supreme Court
decisions in the area of search and seizure, Professor Alschuler notes that:
[Bright-line] [r]ules tend to limit the importance of subjective judgment,
to promote equality, to control corruption, to simplify administration and
to provide a basis for planning before and after controversies arise. Nev-
ertheless, the limitations of language and the variety and unpredictability
of human behavior make extremely difficult the articulation of general
principles that will yield justice in almost every situation that they ad-
dress. When the best rules that our powers can devise produce injustice
[Vol. 61: 453
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the basis for their suspicions, the arrest power can be used
arbitrarily, to confirm a hunch or an unsubstantiated suspi-
cion.43
often enough, we do well to abandon them even at the price of lawless-
ness.
Id. at 227.
The Supreme Court consistently has recognized that a primary purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to combat arbitrarily exercised police discretion. The
history surrounding the Fourth Amendment is replete with references to the un-
bridled discretion conferred on those operating under the authority of general war-
rants and writs of assistance. See generally, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). These devices permitted
the police to decide whom, where and for what to search, without requiring a
showing of individualized suspicion that evidence would be found on a particular
person or in a particular place. Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the
Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Ar-
rest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 254 (1989). For discussions of the
history of general warrants and writs of assistance, and their influence on the
drafting of the Fourth Amendment, see Salken, supra, at 254-57, and authorities
cited therein, and Amsterdam, supra at 410-12.
The Fourth Amendment protects against indiscriminate and arbitrary police
action in two ways. First, police must conduct searches pursuant to a warrant
issued by a neutral judicial officer. The warrant must specifically limit the scope
of the ensuing search in order to provide a protective wedge between a citizen and
a police officer. Second, the Fourth Amendment imposes a standard of reasonable-
ness "upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforce-
ment agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
While most commentators agree that the history surrounding the enactment of
the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Framers were concerned with the indis-
criminate nature of general warrants and writs of assistance, Professor Telford
Taylor has argued that the Framers were not concerned with warrantless searches
at all, but simply with overreaching warrants. Amsterdam, supra, at 410 (discuss-
ing Professor Taylor's view of the warrant and reasonableness clauses of the
Fourth Amendment). According to the latter view, the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment addresses warrantless searches and, contrary to the
Supreme Courts interpretation, the amendment does not embody an overriding
preference for warrants. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment permits a broad
range of reasonable warrantless searches. Id. Professor Amsterdam, on the other
hand, believes that the Courts analysis of warrantless searches correctly permits
the Court to impart meaning to the characteristics of unreasonable warrantless
searches. According to this view, the Court should inquire into what the condem-
nation of general warrants and writs of assistance implies about the nature of
unreasonable searches. Id. at 410-11. Thus, warrantless searches that exhibit the
same characteristics as general warrants or writs of assistance must be deemed
unreasonable if nothing else distinguishes them from those types of searches. Id.
at 411. Because the Framers accepted specific warrants as reasonable, the feature
of the general warrants and writs of assistance that the Framers found objection-
able must have been their indiscriminate or arbitrary character. Id.
1995]
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Police exercise broad discretion with respect to arrest
decisions, particularly when the offense is minor and usually
ignored. According to one commentator, when police utilize the
power to arrest and search in such a selective manner
whether you and I get arrested and subjected to a full-scale...
search or are sent upon our respective ways with a pink multi-form
and a disapproving cluck when we happen to go for a drive.., de-
pends upon the state of digestion of any officer who stops us-or,
more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our automobiles,
the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair or the color of
our skin."
Amsterdam, supra note 42 at 416. Professor Amsterdam is not alone in
recognizing the implications of police discretion in this area. Mark Baker inter.
viewed over one hundred police officers anonymously throughout the country.
Drawing on these interviews, he posited the following situation as illustrative of
some of the elements that may influence a police officer exercising discretion to
arrest for a minor traffic violation:
As you are driving down the highway, suddenly there are flashing lights
in the rear-view mirror and the whoop of a siren in your ears. A small
dose of adrenaline surges into your blood stream. Your heart beats faster;
your palms sweat. You feel guilty whether you've consciously done some-
thing wrong or not. Everyone is afraid of the police.
There is really little to fear, especially if you are white and middle-
class. The police officer will be civil and efficient. He will finish his busi-
ness and have you back on the road in a matter of minutes. If he gives
you a ticket, you can probably afford to pay the fine. No real damage is
done, just a slight inconvenience and perhaps some minor bruises on
your ego from being told you were wrong.
However, the police officer who stops you does have some extraordi.
nary powers....
A police officer is well trained to deal calmly and coolly with the
public. Even when he is confronted with abusive language and disre-
spectful behavior, he must suppress his personal prejudices and wield his
authority with fairness. He is taught to hold his temper and to act in a
detached, professional manner. And he does-most of the time.
But a cop is only human. Every police officer has had a bad day-a
hangover, a fight with the wife, a screw-up with the bosses-and has
taken it out on the citizenry. He is rude, insulting, intimidating. Many a
cop has given in to temptation and has misused his discretionary powers
to gratify his own ego....
MARK BAKER, Cops: THEIR LIVES IN THEIR OWN WORDS 205-06 (1985). See also
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 167 (1969)
(noting that "administrative choices to enforce or not to enforce are often made by
a single officer, usually unsupervised, usually unchecked, almost always without a
systematic statement of findings, almost always without a reasoned opinion, usual-
ly without any reporting to anyone of pressures or extraneous influences, and
almost always without opportunity for the public to observe what is done or un-
done or with what motivations").
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Both the pervasiveness of traffic infractions and the ease of
detecting them illustrate the potential for abuse of discretion
in such situations.45
B. Pretext and the 'Objective Reasonableness" Standard for
Determining Probable Cause
The Supreme Court has never excluded evidence solely
because it was obtained as a result of a pretextual arrest.46
Yet, in a number of cases, including cases involving arrests for
minor traffic violations, members of the Court have indicated
" See WAYNE P, LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 1.4(e) at 95 (2d ed. 1987).
' The Court bypassed the opportunity to decide the pretext issue squarely
when it dismissed its writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in State v. Blair,
691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert. granted sub nor., Ml"ouri v. Blair,
474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987), overruled by State v.
Mlease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 106 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). In Blair, police were informed
that Zola Blair was involved in a murder, but did not have probable cause to
arrest her. The only physical evidence found at the crime scene was a palm print.
Id. at 260. Blair's fingerprints were not on file at the police station, so no compar-
ison could be made. Id. Prior to taking Blair into custody for the murder, police
discovered that she was the subject of an outstanding warrant for a traffic viola-
tion. They arrested Blair, brought her involuntarily to the homicide unit and too]:
her palm prints and fingerprints. She was detained overnight. Fifteen minutes
after her release she was booked on the traffic warrant. Id. After police discovered
that her palm print matched the one taken at the crime scene, Blair was arrested
for murder. She was confronted with the evidence of the matching prints and
made inculpatory statements. Id. The trial court found that Blair was never in
legal custody because the arrest on the traffic warrant was a pretext to obtain her
palm print. It granted her motion to suppress the palm print as the product of an
illegal detention and the statements as the fruit of the illegally obtained palm
print. Id. at 261. The Supreme Court of Mlissouri affirmed the trial courts deci-
sion, id. at 264, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted the State's
petition for certiorari. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986). In her brief to the
Supreme Court, Blair argued that the finding of pretext dearly was supported by
the record and additionally requested that the Court rule that the subjective in-
tent of an arresting officer is relevant to assessing the existence of pretext. John
M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. Dgr.
L. REV. 363, 393 & nn.134-136 (1989) (citing Brief for Respondent at 2241, Mis-
souri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986) (No. 85-303), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 689
(1987)).
This term the Court denied certiorari in three pretextual arrest cases. See
United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994);
United States v. Harvey, 24 F.3d 795 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 258




that they consider pretextual behavior to be of constitutional
significance and that, if presented squarely with the issue,
they would find such conduct unconstitutional.47  Consider-
4' See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 148 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating that there is "no doubt that [pretextual] searches violate the
Fourth Amendment" but conceding that the case did not involve a question of
pretext); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (noting that because the officer has discretion to arrest or to issue a
citation "[tihere is always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable
cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct
a search"); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 n.2 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (the case "would have presented a different question if petitioner could
have proved that he was taken into custody only to afford a pretext for a search
actually undertaken for collateral objectives"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
767 (1969) (in restricting the scope of a search of petitioner's home incident to his
arrest, Court notes that "petitioner correctly points out that one result of [the
Court's prior scope] decisions . . . is to give law enforcement officials the opportu-
nity . . . of arranging to arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere [in order
to search the home]"); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960) (although
finding no pretext, Court generally condemns the practice of using an administra-
tive warrant to gather evidence in a criminal case, noting that "[w]ere this claim
justified by the record, it would indeed reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforc-
ing officers [because] [t]he deliberate use by the Government of an administrative
warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case must be met
with stern resistance by the courts"); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
466 (1932) (holding that arrest does not confer the authority to conduct a general
exploratory search of premises and noting that "[an arrest may not be used as a
pretext to search for evidence.").
Commentators differ sharply over how the Supreme Court cases in this area
should be construed. Professor Burkoff maintains that the cases cited above and
others that he points to, especially in the areas of inventory and administrative
searches, indicate that the Supreme Court examines the question of pretext on a
case-by-case basis and that the Court finds the arresting officer's intent dispositive
in pretext cases. John J. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It,
Now You Don't, 17 MICH. J. L. REF. 523, 544-50 (1984); see also Burkoff, supra
note 2, at 75-83. Professor Haddad, on the other hand, criticizes this approach. He
argues that the Court has adopted what he calls the "hard choices" approach to
pretextual police activity. According to Professor Haddad, the Court examines
whether the authority of the police in a given situation is susceptible to abuse by
means of its use as a pretext and then limits that authority accordingly. Haddad,
supra note 2, at 654-55. Professor Butterfoss, in turn, argues that the Burkoff and
Haddad approaches are overinclusive. He reconciles them by arguing that the
Court only utilizes a case-by-case approach if it finds that the police have resorted
to a fabricated pretext (see, supra note 2), but where the pretext is not fabricated,
the Court utilizes the "hard choices" approach. Butterfoss, supra note 2, at 6.
Although a full discussion of these approaches is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, it should be noted that under Butterfoss's approach the Court would find
the arrest in Scopo constitutional because Scopo contended that the traffic infrac-
tion he committed was used as a pretext to conduct a warrantless search and not
that the infraction was fabricated post-arrest. Under Haddad's approach, the Court
would consider restricting the underlying authority of the police in such situations
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ation of the issue of pretext is premature, if not irrelevant,
however, without a threshold determination that the minor
traffic violation itself establishes probable cause to make the
arrest.
Prior to making an arrest, police must establish that they
have probable cause to do so. Probable cause is the minimum
quantum of knowledge that an officer must have in order to
effect a search or a seizure. It exists where "the facts and cir-
cumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information are suffi-
cient in and of themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being com-
mitted" and that the person to be arrested committed the of-
fense.'
The Court's pronouncements concerning the proper stan-
dard for determining probable cause have proved troublesome
to federal courts reviewing pretextual arrests because the ob-
jective standard of reasonableness adopted by the Court ap-
pears to preclude consideration of the subjective motivations of
an arresting officer. This notion, in turn, appears to conflict
with the Court's concern over pretextual police activity. Thus,
courts attempting to give content to the concept of pretext
must reconcile two apparently contradictory lines of Supreme
Court authority.
1. The Scott Trilogy
The Court first enunciated an entirely objective approach
to search and seizure issues in Scott v. United States.! The
because of its susceptibility to being used as a pretext. This result could be accom-
plished by limiting the scope of the search incident to a traffic offense arrest or
limiting the authority of police to make such arrests. See discussion infra part IV.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (citation omitted).
436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985), and United
States v. Villamonte-Aarquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), the Court reaffirmed this stan-
dard. These cases are hereinafter referred to as 'the Scott trilogy." All of the cir-
cuit courts passing on the question of pretext recognize this trilogy. See United
States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-83 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dcnied, 115 S. Ct 207
(1994); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g and reh'g
en bane denied (Aug. 8, 1994); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391-92 (6th
Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994); United States v. Hassan
El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994); United
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 428
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question presented to the Court in Scott was whether federal
agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they intercepted
telephone conversations pursuant to an authorized wiretap
without attempting to minimize the interception of calls unre-
lated to their investigation." In addressing this question, the
Court stated that for purposes of evaluating alleged violations
of the Fourth Amendment, the applicable standard is one of
"objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying
intent or motivation of the officers involved."" Consequently,
"the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which
is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justifi-
cation for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action."52 Although in Scott the agents had intercepted
virtually all of the calls made or received on the tapped tele-
phone, the Court found that their actions were objectively
(1991); United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (5th Cir. 1987) (on
banc); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986).
A fourth case that cites Scott as setting the standard for the proper scope of
a fourth amendment inquiry is Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Graham
did not present the Court with a pretext question; rather the central issue in
Graham was the proper standard for evaluating excessive-force claims that had
arisen in the context of an arrest or other seizure. Id. at 388. In determining that
the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard applies to such
claims, the Court noted that "[a]n officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth
Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an
officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitution-
al." Id. at 397.
6' Scott, 436 U.S. at 135. In Scott, government officials applied for authoriza-
tion to wiretap a telephone that they had probable cause to believe was being
used in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Id. at 131. A magis.
trate authorized the wiretap pursuant to a federal law permitting certain types of
electronic surveillance. The statute, however, requires that such surveillance "be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under [the statute]." Id. at 130 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(5)). Because the agents admitted their awareness of the minimization re-
quirement, but made no attempt to comply with it, the district court granted a
motion to suppress all of the intercepted conversations. Id. at 133-34 & n.7. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, finding that the proper
standard for determining the reasonableness of the interceptions did not rest on
"whether the agents subjectively intended to minimize their interceptions." Id. at
134.




reasonable under the circumstances because the case involved
a wide-ranging conspiracy and the relevancy of the calls could
not be determined without listening to them.' Thus, the
Court declined to suppress the incriminating conversations.'
If applied broadly to all areas of fourth amendment activ-
ity, Scott sounds the death knell for judicial inquiries into the
subjective motivations of an arresting officer for purposes of
determining fourth amendment violations.' In fact, the sec-
ond case in the Scott trilogy, United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez,56 appears to expand the scope of the objective rea-
sonableness inquiry to pretextual arrests.
Villamonte-Marquez was convicted of possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute after a customs agent, who had
ostensibly boarded Villamonte-Marquez's boat to check its
documentation, spotted a large amount of marijuana.' Al-
though the central issue was the validity of a federal statute
permitting the warrantless boarding of vessels for purposes of
checking documentation,' Villamonte-Marquez also argued
that because the customs agent was accompanied by a state
policeman and was acting pursuant to a tip that a vessel in the
vicinity was carrying marijuana, he was precluded from relying
= Id. at 142.
' Id. at 141.
The Scott language can be read narrowly for a number of reasons. First,
Scott is not a pretext case; no allegation was made that the officers applied for
and used the wiretap for the purpose of intercepting calls that they otherwise
would not have been able to intercept, with the hope of gathering evidence of an-
other crime not under investigation. Second, the Court did not squarely address
the question of the agents' intent. In Scott, although only about 40, of the calls
intercepted by the agents were narcotics related, virtually all of the calls were
intercepted. Id. at 132. These facts indicate that the agents intended to disregard
the miniTmiation requirement of the statute. The Court used there facts, however,
to determine the sufficiency of the minimization that took place rather than to
examine the intent of the agents.
" 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
57 Id. at 582-83.
' The customs agent made the entry pursuant to a federal statute providing
that "[any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel...
at any place in the United States . . . and examine the manifest and other docu-
ments and papers . . . and to this end may hail and stop such vessel .. . and
use all necessary force to compel reliance." 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976 & Supp.
1994). Villamonte-Alarquez argued that the statute violated the Fourth
Amendments prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by permitting
entry in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Vlarnonta-
Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584-85.
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on the statute.59 The Court disposed of this argument in a
single footnote, pointing out that "[t]his line of reasoning was
rejected in a similar situation in Scott..., and we again reject
it.... We would see little logic in sanctioning such examina-
tions of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the
case of suspected smugglers."6' Thus, Villamonte-Marquez
appears to dismiss the notion that the otherwise valid actions
of an arresting officer are unconstitutional solely because the
officer used the arrest in order to search for evidence related to
another offense.61
The Court reiterated the objective reasonableness standard
in Maryland v. Macon.62 In Macon, plainclothes detectives
purchased magazines from an adult bookstore using a marked
fifty-dollar bill. After confirming the fact that the magazines
were obscene, the detectives returned to the store, arrested
Macon and retrieved the fifty-dollar bill from the cash register
without returning the change they received when the purchase
was made.6" Macon subsequently moved to suppress the mag-
azines as the product of an illegal seizure, arguing that the
subjective intent of the detectives to retrieve the marked bill
without returning the change converted what would otherwise
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3.
£0 Id. (citations omitted).
6 The facts of Villamonte-Marquez do not necessarily lend themselves to an
analysis of a typical pretextual traffic stop situation. First, the Villamonte.Marquez
Court placed significance on the pedigree of the federal statute in question, noting
that it was passed by the same Congress that had promulgated the Bill of Rights
and that the type of seizure it permitted was thus not considered unconstitutional
by the Framers. Id. at 585-86. Arguably, the same degree of deference might not
be given to state laws permitting arrests for minor traffic violations. Additionally,
the Court distinguished the type of seizure conducted in Villamonte-Marquez from
discretionary stops of automobiles. In so doing it noted that the intrusive nature
of roving patrol stops of automobiles militated in favor of curbing the discretion of
the police to make such stops, especially where a less intrusive method such as
fixed checkpoint stops was available and would serve the same underlying govern-
mental interest in permitting the stop. Id. at 588-89. The Court found that no
such alternative was available in the case of seafaring vessels. Id. at 589. Lastly,
in noting these differences, the Court stated that had the customs agent in
Villamonte-Marquez stopped an automobile without articulable suspicion, the stop
would have run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 588. This final point is
inapposite with respect to pretextual traffic offense stops because probable cause to
make the stop always exists in such situations.
472 U.S. 463 (1985).
6 Id. at 465.
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have been a bona fide purchase into a warrantless seizure."
The Court rejected the argument that the subjective intent of
the officers was dispositive or even relevant to determining
whether a seizure had taken place. Citing Scott, the Court
noted that "[olbjectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in
the ordinary course of business... [and] is not retrospectively
transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's
subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as
evidence."' Thus, the true reason for the detectives' purchase
of the magazines-to conduct a criminal investigation and not
to make a bona fide purchase-was irrelevant for purposes of
determining whether a fourth amendment violation had taken
place.
The Scott trilogy laid the groundwork for the district
court's decision suppressing Scopo's gun. Ironically, it also
provided the foundation for the Second Circuit's reversal of
that decision.
II. THE Scopo DECISION
A. Factual Background
In November of 1991, a shooting war commenced between
feuding factions of the Colombo Family.6 At least six murders
were committed and a dozen attempted in connection with the
shooting war. The shootings were carried out by "hit teams"
comprised of shooters who would travel "caravan style" in
automobiles.' In an effort to respond to the violence, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and the New York City Police
Department formed the Colombo Strike Force ("Strike
Force!').s
On the night of January 17, 1992, New York City police
"Id. at 470.
"Id. at 471.
United States v. Scopo, 814 F. Supp. 292, 294 (ED.N.Y. 1993), reu'd, 19
F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994).
1 "Caravan style" refers to vehicles travelling "in a line, following one another,
turning with one another, staying in a group." Transcript of Hearing Before the
Honorable I. Leo Glasser at 29, July 2, 1992, United States v. Scopo, 814 F. Supp.
292 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (No. 92-184), reu'd, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 207 (1994) [hereinafter 'Transcript of Suppression Hearing].
"Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 294.
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detectives assigned to the Strike Force were conducting sur-
veillance of the Mill Basin Social Club in Brooklyn, New York,
a known meeting place of one of the warring factions of the
Colombo Family. The detectives observed four men leave the
club and identified two as members of the Colombo Family.
The men entered four cars and drove away in caravan style.
The detectives followed the cars to Joseph Scopo's residence. A
short time later, the detectives located two of the four vehicles
double-parked on the wrong side of the street in front of the
residence of Salvatore Micciotta.69
Although the detectives had summons books with them,
and the cars were parked in violation of New York City traffic
regulations, they did not issue any summons at that time."0
The officers next saw two men, Anthony Mesi and Joseph
Scopo, leave the residence and enter the two cars. Mesi was
carrying a rifle case. That information was relayed to the en-
tire surveillance team. The detectives followed the two cars,
which again were travelling caravan style. They saw the driv-
ers of both cars twice fail to signal when changing lanes, but
did not pull them over. 1
The detectives continued following the cars for approxi-
mately two miles, until they stopped at a red light. They
boxed-in the cars by positioning police vehicles in front, at the
side and behind the caravan. 2 Three detectives, at least two
of whom had guns drawn, approached Scopo's car. One of the
detectives saw Scopo throw an object, later identified as a
cellular phone, into the back of the car. Scopo was removed
from the car and frisked for weapons. 3 At the same time, an-
other of the detectives looked in the car and observed the butt




7'2 Id. at 294-95.
73 Id. at 295.
7 The plain view doctrine entitles police to seize evidence without a warrant
when that evidence is visible to them during the course of a legal search or sei-
zure. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (citing Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). A plain
view seizure is valid only when the incriminating nature of the item seized is
immediately apparent and the item is discovered during the course of an arrest
authorized by law. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (citing Texas v.
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passenger seat. The gun was fully loaded and the serial num-
ber had been obliterated. Scopo was arrested and later indicted
for possessing a handgun with the serial number removed in
violation of federal law."5
B. The District Court Decision
Scopo moved pretrial to suppress the gun. He contended
that the traffic stop made by the detectives was a pretext to
enable them to search his car for weapons and that the gun
was, therefore, the "fruit"76 of an illegal search.17 The govern-
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 and n.4, 741-42 (1983) (plurality opinion)). Thus, the
plain view doctrine legitimizes the seizure of objects which are otherwise outside
the permissible scope of a search. Arizona v. Hicks 480 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1986).
' Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 295.
'i Evidence discovered as the direct result of unconstitutional police activity is
generally inadmissible at trial because it is considered the "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-88 (1963).
' Scopo also claimed that because he was arrested pursuant to state law, the
federal court determining the legality of the arrest was obligated to refer to state
law to determine whether it should suppress the evidence seized as a result of the
arrest. Scopo, 814 F. Supp at 295 n.6.
Scopo's argument on this point is more clearly set forth in his brief before the
Second Circuit. Scopo argued that because the propriety of the search in question
was wholly dependent on state law, the federal court should loh to both state
statutes and caselaw to determine the validity of the arrest. Brief for Defendant-
Appellee at 40, United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.) (No. 93-1201), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994) [hereinafter "Opening Brief"]. In essence, he asked
the federal court to look beyond the plain words of the statute that authorized an
arrest for a traffic infraction and consider state caselaw, which he argued did not
permit an arrest under these circumstances despite the plain words of the statute.
The district court rejected the argument that state suppression law applied. Scopeo,
814 F. Supp. at 295-96 n.6 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24
(1960) ("In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and sei-
zure by state officers [in a federal criminal trial], a federal court must make an
independent inquiry.... The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what
one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may
have colorably suppressed)). It found that New York traffic law provided grounds
for an arrest, but that federal pretext doctrine should be applied to determine the
constitutionality, as opposed to the legality, of that arrest. Id.
Application of state law to the seizure would have been beneficial to Scopo for
a number of reasons. First, under New York law, pretextual arrests are impermis-
sible seizures. See, e.g., People v. Llopis, 125 A.D.2d 416, 417, 509 N.Y.S2d 135,
136 (2d Dep't 1986). Moreover, the subjective intent of the arresting officer is
relevant to the determination of pretext in New York. See, eg., People v. Smith,
181 A-D.2d 802, 803, 581 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (2d Dep't 1992). Second, although the
statutory language itself clearly permits an arrest for a traffic infraction (see infra
note 98), as Scopo pointed out in his brief, New York courts appear to have
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ment contended that the detectives had probable cause to ar-
rest Scopo for violating a traffic law and that the gun should
therefore be admissible.8
The district court granted the motion to suppress. It first
noted that while the Supreme Court has recognized the exis-
tence of pretext doctrine, it has never defined the contours of
the doctrine.79 It then noted that all of the circuit courts of
appeals that had passed on the pretext question were in agree-
ment that, in accord with the Scott trilogy, a wholly objective
inquiry is appropriate for purposes of determining pretext.80
The district court observed that the circuit courts predominant-
ly use two tests to define the parameters of an objective review
in the context of pretextual arrests. Some circuits have adopted
the "usual police practices" test-referred to herein as the
"would have test"-which focuses not on "whether the officer
could validly have made the stop, but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop
in the absence of the invalid purpose."" Other circuits have
placed a gloss over the statutory language that limits arrests to situations where
the traffic violation poses a threat to public safety or where the motorist is unable
to produce identification. Opening Brief supra, at 43-44. In all other instances,
police should issue traffic citations in lieu of making an arrest. Id.
"' Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 295. The government argued alternatively that the
detectives had reasonable suspicion to believe that "criminal activity was afoot,"
therefore justifying an investigative stop as provided by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21 (1968). Id. The Court rejected this argument, noting that when the detectives
surrounded and boxed-in the two cars, drew their weapons and removed the occu-
pants from the vehicle, the stop was converted into a full-blown arrest requiring
probable cause. Id. at 297-98 (citing United States v. Matin, 669 F.2d 73, 81 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("probable cause is necessary when police restrain an individual in a
manner that, although not technically an arrest, is nonetheless so intrusive as to
be 'tantamount' to an arrest .... The reasonableness of a particular stop depends
in turn on the extent of the intrusion on the rights of the individual, and on the
reason for the restraint")).
" Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 299.
" Id. at 300.
81 Id. (citing United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988)). In addi-
tion to the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the would
have test. Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 300. The Eleventh Circuit adopted the test first
and continues to apply it in determining whether a pretextual arrest has occurred.
See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir. 1986) (instituting would
have test) and United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1987) (reaf-
firming validity of would have test). Subsequent to the district court's opinion in
Scopo, however, the Sixth Circuit abandoned the would have test in favor of an
approach that validates an arrest "so long as the officer has probable cause to
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adopted the "authorization" test-referred to herein as the
"could have test"-which rejects any inquiry into the usual
police practices and instead focuses on whether the officer in
question would be 'legally permitted and objectively authorized
[to make] an arrest."2
In finding that "the pretext doctrine retains vitality in [the
Second C]ircuit[,]"' the district court relied primarily on the
Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Caming.' In that
case, Stanley Caming was convicted of structuring currency
transactions to avoid reporting requirements and causing fi-
nancial institutions to fail to file currency transaction re-
ports.s Internal Revenue agents had arrested Caming, pursu-
ant to a warrant, as he was exiting the parking lot of an ath-
letic club in his car. Earlier on the morning of his arrest, they
had watched his apartment for over three hours until discover-
ing that his car was not in the garage of the apartment build-
ing. They then proceeded to the athletic club where they had
previously observed Caming on numerous occasions. When
they saw his car in the parking lot of the athletic club, the
agents parked on the street and waited for Caming to exit the
club. They then blocked Caming's automobile with their own
cars, arrested him and searched his automobile, discovering
various financial records which were later used to convict him
believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring." United States v.
Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97
(1994). Additionally, since the district court's opinion in Scopo, the Ninth Circuit
appears to have adopted the would have test. United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d
472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that traffic stop was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, but stating that 'vwe treat our previous cases as consistent with the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits' objective %vould have' standard").
' Scopo, 814 F. Supp at 300. As the Scopo Court noted, the Fifth, Seventh
and Eighth Circuits have adopted the could haue test. See United States v.
Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991);
United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 502 US.
962 (1991); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc). Subsequent to the district court's decision in Scopo, the Fourth Circuit also
adopted the could have test, United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994), and, as mentioned in note 82 supra,
the Sixth Circuit abandoned its adherence to the would have test in favor of the
could have test. Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391.
Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 303.
u 968 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 416 (1992).




In his appeal before the Second Circuit, Caming contended
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sup-
press the financial records recovered from the car because the
agents purposefully delayed arresting him until he was in his
car in order to search it. 7 The Second Circuit first noted the
legal standard articulated and applied by the lower court:
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of
an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search
the passenger compartment of the vehicle.... Where, however, it appears
that the search and not the arrest was the real purpose in effecting a war.
rantless search of the premises, "and that the arrest was a pretext for or at
most an incident of the search," the search is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.'
It then affirmed Caming's conviction, accepting the lower
court's finding that the detectives had no such pretextual moti-
vations.
The Scopo court distinguished Caming, by pointing to two
factors relied upon by the Second Circuit in concluding that
the agents' arrest of Caming in his automobile was not
pretextual, factors that were absent in Scopo's case. First, the
officers who arrested Caming used reasonable precaution to
preserve their own safety and to avoid arousing the suspicions
of others still under investigation. Second, if the officers were
conducting a pretextual arrest, they probably would have ar-
rested Caming in his apartment, where they would be more
likely to find evidence.89 In addition to construing Caming as
affirming the would have test, the district court found that the
test has the advantage of preserving the requisite objective
standard while providing a "meaningful review of discretionary
police action."9
Applying the would have test, the court concluded that
Scopo's arrest was pretextual and granted his motion to sup-
Id. at 235.
'Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Caming, 756 F. Supp. 121, 123-24 (SI).N.Y.
1991) (citation omitted).
Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 303 (citing Caming, 968 F.2d at 236).




press the gun." The court pointed to several factors support-
ing its conclusion that absent an invalid purpose, a reasonable
officer would not have arrested Scopo for failing to signal.'
First, the violation occurred at night, when no other vehicles
were present on the street and the vehicle had not been speed-
ing. It therefore posed no danger to public safety. Second, al-
though one of the detectives testified that it was common prac-
tice to pull over a vehicle immediately upon witnessing a viola-
tion, the detectives did not stop Scopo until he proceeded ap-
proximately two miles after failing to signal. Third, the detec-
tives failed to issue a summons for the earlier violation they
had witnessed." Finally, the court noted both that the Strike
Force's purpose was to stop the shooting war by means of ag-
gressive law enforcement, and that the members of the Strike
Force were aware that traffic stops previously had been used
with success against other Colombo Family members in order
to seize illegal weapons.'
C. The Second Circuit Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's order granting Scopo's motion to suppress."
The court began by recognizing that "a traffic stop constitutes
a limited seizure within the meaning of the Fourth ... Amend-
ment"96 and thus "must be justified by probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, of
unlawful conduct."7 Applying this rule, the court found that
the traffic violation witnessed by the Strike Force members
provided the requisite probable cause to make an arrest. The
91 Id. at 305.
2 Id. at 304-05.
13 Id.
"Id.
" United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 207 (1994). The Second Circuit's decision in Scopo clarified Second Circuit
pretextual arrest law. After the district court's decision in Scopo, but prior to the
Second Circuits decision, another court in the Second Circuit applied the could
have test in United States v. Barber, 839 F. Supp. 193, 199 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
" Scopo, 19 F.3d at 781 (citing United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729
(4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994) (citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).




court asserted that, although the violation was minor, the
detectives acted within their authority when they stopped
Scopo's car because New York law permits a police officer to
stop a car and arrest its driver for such a violation. 8 Further-
more, the Second Circuit found that the factors relied upon by
the district court to support a finding of pretext were irrele-
vant because they did not "negate the fact that [the Strike
Force members] had directly observed Scopo violate the traffic
laws and thus had probable cause to arrest him."99 The court
further asserted that, because the police had probable cause to
stop and arrest Scopo, they were entitled to search both Scopo
and the "grab space"0 0 in his car, particularly when one of
the detectives had observed Scopo throwing an object into the
back seat of the car. 1' Finally, because both the officers'
" Id. The Court cited to both New York statutory authority and caselaw that
permits an arrest for a traffic violation witnessed by the arresting officer. See N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155 (McKinney 1986 and Supp. 1994) ("For purposes of ar-
rest without a warrant, pursuant to article one hundred forty of the criminal pro.
cedure law, a traffic infraction shall be deemed an offense."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 140.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1992) ('an officer may arrest a person for [any
offense when [he] has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed
such crime in [his] presence"). See also People v. Cortes, 86 Misc.2d 155, 158, 382
N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) ('a police officer [is empowered to]
arrest a person for [any traffic infraction] committed in the officer's presence").
Whether New York State courts still permit such an arrest is unclear. See supra
note 77.
" Scopo, 19 F.3d at 782.
100 Id. The term "grab space" denotes the area that may be searched incident to
an arrest and encompasses "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460
(1981) (citation omitted). The grab space of an automobile includes the entire pas-
senger compartment, as well as the contents of any containers found therein. Id.
at 460, 461 & n.4.
101 Scopo, 19 F.3d at 782 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)
("when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the pas-
senger compartment of the automobile") (footnotes omitted) and United States v.
Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1988) (furtive movements provide a legal basis
for a protective search), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1052 (1989)). At the time police
frisked Scopo and searched his car, he had not yet been placed under arrest.
Transcript of Suppression Hearing supra note 67, at 35-36. Technically, neither
Scopo nor his car could, at that point, have been subject to a search incident to
arrest. But see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 70-79 (1968) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in result) (so long as probable cause to arrest exists, in the interest of the
officer's safety, the search may slightly precede the formal arrest). Presuming that
the initial stop of the car was permissible, the court found that a protective frisk
of both Scopo and his vehicle was also permissible under the circumstances be-
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presence at the scene and a protective search of the car were
legally justified, the detectives were entitled to seize any in-
criminating objects discovered in plain view during the course
of the search.
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's application
of the would have test. It found that such an approach was
inconsistent with a completely objective review of alleged
fourth amendment violations because the test requires a re-
viewing court to look into the motivations and hopes of the ar-
resting officer. 2 The Second Circuit cited a number of Su-
preme Court cases, including the Scott trilogy, which it inter-
preted as prohibiting any such inquiry where the arresting
officer has probable cause to make a valid arrest."° The
could have test, however, requires no such inquiry, and
therefore better facilitates the objective assessment required in
fourth amendment cases.'
The Second Circuit also articulated several policies under-
lying its conclusion that the authorization approach-the could
have test-is preferable to its alternative. First, the test en-
sures that the validity of traffic stops and arrests are not "sub-
ject to the vagaries of police departments' policies and proce-
dures."'0 5 Second, it prevents persons involved in criminal ac-
tivity from being insulated from liability simply because a
judge later determines that the arresting officer would not
have stopped the vehicle for an offense that the driver conced-
edly committed. Third, this approach gives law enforcement
officers the freedom to enforce violations of the law that they
have witnessed. Fourth, it maintains legislative control over
the task of authorizing which traffic violations police officers
can enforce. 6
In addition to these policy concerns, the Second Circuit
cause of the furtive movement the detectives had witnessed.
1 Scopo, 19 F.3d at 782.
103 Id. at 782-83 (citing, inter alia, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990);
laryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); United States v. Vilaimonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579 (1983); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973)).
104 Id. at 784.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993) (en
banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994)).
"' Id. at 785 (citing United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993)
(en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994)).
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determined that the authorization approach is consistent with
its pretext doctrine as articulated in prior cases. It took issue
with the district court's broad reading of Caming, pointing out
that in that case
[we simply agreed with the district court's determination that the
defendant [had not shown that his arrest was pretextual]. We never
reached the question of whether the arrest would have been consti-
tutional if the defendant had demonstrated that his arrest was
pretextual. Caming does not provide a basis for concluding that the
"usual police practices" approach has been adopted in this Cir-
cuit.1
0 7
In closing, the court briefly addressed the concern raised
by Scopo that the authorization approach fails to prevent and
in fact encourages arbitrary police action. °s The court dis-
agreed, noting that whichever test is applied, "a reviewing
court must always consider the reasonableness of the officer's
conduct in light of the circumstances following the initial
stop.' 09
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Newman agreed
that current fourth amendment jurisprudence requires courts
to adopt the could have test. ° Chief Judge Newman also ad-
dressed the danger that courts are unable to detect arbitrary
and harassing arrest tactics when applying the test."' He
emphasized that the court's opinion did not support or encour-
age selective enforcement of the law against particular groups
and suggested that officers who so abused their arrest power
could be subject to civil suits for discriminatory enforcement of
the law."' In closing, Chief Judge Newman stated explicitly
what was left unsaid by the majority opinion: the Fourth
Amendment does not preclude pretextual arrests."'
107 Id. at 784-85 (citation omitted).
100 Opening Brief, supra note 77, at 30-31.
'o' Scopo, 19 F.3d. at 785 (citation omitted).
... Id. at 785 (Newman, C. J., concurring).
"I Id. at 785.
112 Id. at 786. For a discussion of Judge Newman's concurring opinion and the





The guiding principle of the Second Circuit's decision is
that the Scott trilogy applies to the specific type of activity at
issue in Scopo." Assuming the validity of that presumption
raises certain questions. First, does the Scott trilogy require
institution of the could have test? Second, if so, are there any
remaining judicial restraints against pretextual arrests? Third,
how effectively does the test address the policy issues raised by
the Second Circuit? Finally, presuming that subjective intent is
beyond the scope of permissible judicial review, how effective is
a selective enforcement remedy in combatting arbitrary police
arrest practices? This section addresses those questions.
A. Applying the Scott Trilogy to Pretextual Arrests
Stripped of pretense, the could have test is not a test at
all. Because it presumes that any legally cognizable arrest,
even one for the most minor of violations, is a sufficient basis
for a search, it is impossible for a reviewing court to find that
such arrests are unconstitutional pretexts. The district court in
Scopo recognized as much, finding that the test inevitably
"immunizes from judicial scrutiny any arbitrary and unreason-
able use by police officers of minor violations." "a In its stead,
the district court instituted the would have test, a test that
permits such scrutiny, but carries with it the inherent draw-
back of only superficially preserving a wholly objective inquiry.
And while the district court assumed that "courts are capable
of engaging in [the] type of inquiry" 6 necessary to determine
the subjective motivations of an arresting officer, it discussed
neither the feasibility nor the wisdom of a court making such a
determination.
As the government noted in its Second Circuit brief, the
would have test "requires an initial determination as to the
arresting officer's purpose in making the arrest."" This in-
For a discussion of the validity of this assumption see infra part W.C.
"' Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 304.
u6 Id.
I Brief for the United States at 22, United. States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d
Cir) (No. 93-1201), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 [hereinafter "Government Brief].
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quiry is necessary because courts applying the test must deter-
mine why the officer chose to make the arrest in the first in-
stance, and not whether the arrest was objectively reasonable
based on probable cause to arrest for a traffic infraction. The
Second Circuit recognized that couching a subjective review in
objective language does not change the nature of the inquiry.
The would have test inevitably "requires a reviewing court to
look into the motivations and hopes of an arresting officer," 18
if only as an incidental effect of the type of review conducted. 1 9
118 Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 at 782.
... Professor Wayne R. LaFave proposes an approach to pretext that strikes a
balance between the would have and could have tests. He argues that the Scott
approach-disregarding the underlying intent or motivation of the arresting offi-
cer-is correct only if there are more reliable and feasible means for determining
whether or not the challenged arrest was arbitrary. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 45, at 94. He suggests better results can be reached by requiring that
"Fourth Amendment activity [be] carried out in accordance with standard proce-
dures in the local police department." Id. The standard-police-practice approach
provides an objective yardstick to measure police conduct in individual cases.
Moreover, it avoids the subjective intent issue by not requiring a court to deter-
mine why the officer deviated from standard practice, but simply whether such a
deviation occurred.
Although Professor LaFave has not fleshed out the particulars of his ap-
proach, its application presents difficulties. First, definitional problems abound.
What is standard police department practice and who defines it? Must such a
practice be in writing or would a practice that conforms with normal everyday
policing suffice? In Scopo, the detectives were members of a special Strike Force
whose function was to "engage in active, aggressive law enforcement in order to
quell the violence of the Colombo shooting war." Scopo, 814 F. Supp at 304 (cita-
tions omitted). Is such a mandate tantamount to a standard policy of the Strike
Force members, and, if so, does that conclusion insulate entire areas of police
conduct from review simply because they are considered standard practices by a
group or by individual officers? Moreover, with respect to the many types of traffic
infractions that occur, will a court look at the standard practice of enforcement
with respect to each type of infraction? In the case of speeding violations, must a
department have a standard practice of enforcement that differs with respect to
each additional mile that a driver exceeds the speed limit? In Scopo, it was deter-
mined that the standard practice of detectives assigned to organized crime units
was to utilize minor traffic offenses as a means of seizing illegal weapons. Id. at
305 (citation omitted). Could an informal policy designed to combat a specific and
identifiable crime problem be considered a standard practice? Additionally, what
are the geographical and job-related boundaries that define a standard practice? Is
the practice determined with respect to each police department or with respect to
the normal functions of each individual police officer? See Haddad, supra note 2,
at 651.
Institutional problems also abound. What happens when community needs
dictate that standard practices must change? For example, a community may de-
cide to enforce stringently all traffic laws because of an increase in accident-relat-
ed deaths. How, and at what cost, are officers to be apprised of such changes in
[Vol. 61: 453
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Aside from the question of whether the would have test
could ever logically be deemed a wholly objective inquiry as
required by the Scott trilogy, application of the could have test
avoids the many practical problems that can arise if a court
must determine the motivations of an arresting officer. Triers
of fact commonly are called upon to determine subjective intent
in certain contexts. For example, when assessing punitive
damages, juries may be required to make a finding that the
defendant acted maliciously or with an evil motivation.' Ad-
ditionally, state of mind is crucial to a finding of culpability for
almost all criminal offenses. In cases of pretextual arrests,
however, unlike most other situations requiring a determina-
tion of intent, courts will always be faced with a facially valid
and legally cognizable justification for the arrest. As one
commentator notes, this distinction is important for purposes
of determining motivation because
[a] subjective purpose to do something that the applicable legal rules
say there is sufficient objective cause to do can be fabricated all too
easily and undetectably. Motivation is, in any event, a self-generat-
ing phenomenon: if a purpose to search for heroin can be accom-
plished only when accompanied by a purpose to search for a weapon,
knowledgeable officers will seldom experience the first desire with-
out a simultaneous onrush of the second.'2
Instituting a test that encourages fabricated police testi-
standard practice? What if, under these circumstances, an officer inadvertently
failed to adhere to the newly-instituted standard practice, but with a good.faith
belief that the old standard was still in effect? Could a court under those circum-
stances look at the subjective motivations of the officer to validate the arrest on
the theory that there is no reason to deter this kind of good-faith conduct? If so,
is there any distinction between the LaFave approach and the would have tes?
Applying the LaFave approach, the Second Circuit in Scopo could have vali-
dated the actions of the Strike Force members on the ground that standard prac-
tice dictated that they make arrests for minor traffic violations in order to search
for illegal weapons. On the other hand, this approach punishes inadvertent devia-
tions from standard practice even if an officer has no illicit motivations.
Finally, the standard-police-practices approach permits local police departments
to legislate in the area of search and seizure. As a result, police practice will be
constitutional in one jurisdiction, as standard practice there, while unconstitutional
in another that has not adopted the relevant standard. The effect may well be to
undermine the Supreme Court's preference for bright-line rules in the area of
search and seizure law.
32 W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2,
at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984).
21 Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 436-37.
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mony is troubling from a policy standpoint, but the possibility
of perjury always exists. Situations where officers act with
dual motivations are of greater concern from a judicial perspec-
tive. The would have test rests on the premise that an arrest is
pretextual and therefore unreasonable if "under the same cir-
cumstances a reasonable officer would [not] have made the
stop in the absence of the invalid purpose."122 This test is es-
sentially a "but for" test. It requires a court to sift through the
ingredients comprising the officer's motivation and to deter-
mine whether in the absence of one or more of those motivat-
ing factors the officer would not have made the arrest. Al-
though primary motivation may be easier to glean from certain
facts than from others, judicial consistency remains an is-
sue.12
Lastly, for courts to instruct police officers not to do what
they are otherwise legally justified in doing merely because of
their state of mind is somewhat anomalous. 1 2 An officer con-
fronted with a situation where two drivers commit precisely
the same traffic infraction can freely arrest and search only
the driver about whom he or she has no underlying suspicions.
The second driver is immunized from a search or, at a mini-
mum, immunized from prosecution based on any evidence
found as a result of the search primarily because of the
officer's suspicions (which are later confrmed).12
12 Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 304 (citation omitted).
'3 As Professor Haddad points out, police officers choose to conduct searches for
many illegitimate reasons, some of which are more easily detectable by a review.
ing court than others. Haddad, supra note 2, at 642 (pointing out that an officer
may wish to conduct a search because "[t]he officer might be uncommonly
nosy. . . or might wish to harass the individual because of intense personal dis.
like . . . [or] might harbor a bias against persons [of a certain] age, race, or
sex . .. [or] in the hope of discovering evidence of a crime.")
1' Professor Haddad explained his dissatisfaction with the individual motivation
approach by describing his unease in lecturing police officers on fourth amendment
law:
As best I could, I would outline the prerequisites for a valid warrantless
search under one or another of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment... .But I would then warn the officers not to be too "cute" by
using the particular exception for the wrong reason. The wrong reason, of
course, was the quest for incriminating evidence. Eventually, my schizo-
phrenic exhortations began to echo in my ears like some mock
Spenserian refrain: "Be wise, be wise, be wise. But be not too wise."
Haddad, supra note 2, at 691 (citation omitted).
"2 Moreover, as the government noted, permitting the introduction of evidence
[Vol. 61: 453
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B. Review of Pretextual Post-Arrest Searches in the Wake of
Scopo
The essential holding of Scopo, recognized by Chief Judge
Newman's concurring opinion, is that "the Fourth Amendment
permits a pretext arrest."2 Because Scopo restricts review of
such arrests to determinations of whether a traffic offense
occurred, pretexts can be employed to insulate arbitrary ar-
rests from review.' Moreover, the Second Circuit's opinion
potentially curtails the protection against pretextual police
conduct that New York state law affords.
In light of the bright-line rule laid down in Belton,2s it is
difficult to discern what, if any, import can be attributed to the
Second Circuit's assertion that the could have test does not
have the secondary effect of insulating arbitrary police arrest
practice because "a reviewing court must always consider the
reasonableness of the officers' conduct in light of the circum-
stances following the initial stop."' Perhaps the court was
addressing the government's contention that "It1here is a
wealth of judicially and legislatively created standards that
define police officers' authority to make arrests and conduct
post-arrest searches.... Officers must always be able to satis-
fy a reviewing court that they have adhered to those stan-
discovered during a stop made purely to enforce a traffic law, but suppressing the
same evidence under identical circumstances except that the officer has suspicions
about the driver, is tantamount to creating an inadvertence requirement in the
context of traffic stops. The Supreme Court has squarely rejected this requirement
for plain view searches. Government Brief, supra, note 117, at 23 (citing Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)).
" Scopo, 19 F.3d at 786 (Newman, C. J., concurring).
"7 Empirical studies document that police make arrests to conduct mearches
that otherwise could not lawfully be made. See LaFave, eupra note 18, at 153 &
n.116 (citing WAYNE IL LAFAVE, ARREST 151 (1965) and LAVIRECE P. TIFFANY, Er
AL, DETECTION OF CRIME, 136 (1967)). See also Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 305 (dis-
cussing F.B.I strategy of massive enforcement of minor traffic violations as a
means of conducting searches for weapons); United States v. Milio, 588 F. Supp.
45, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (stipulation that traffic stop employed as pretext to rarch
for weapons). Additionally, recent informal studies of videotapes of highway stops
have concluded that stops often are made to search automobiles and seize the
instrumentalities of crime pursuant to civil forfeiture laws. David Heilbroner, The
Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine) at 73.
See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
Scopo, 19 F.3d at 785 (citation omitted).
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dards."" ° A byproduct of the Second Circuit's opinion, how-
ever, is that even stringent application of the standards gov-
erning arrests and searches will not affect pretextual arrest
practice.
First, New York law governing arrests for traffic law viola-
tions requires only that the arresting officer witness the
violation.' Scopo, however, did not contest the violation, but
raised the point that the standard governing such arrests af-
fords no meaningful protection against arbitrary arrests be-
cause the standard itself is so easily met.'32
Second, as previously discussed, federal law stringently
limits review of post-arrest searches of vehicles. 3 Again,
Scopo did not contest the scope of the search conducted by the
Strike Force members; he contested the initial arrest giving
rise to the authority to search. As the government noted, once
the arrest and search meets these minimal standards, "the
defendant cannot show that his rights have been violated, and
there is no basis [for excluding the evidence obtained from the
search] .""3
Scopo's motion to suppress failed because he was charged
with a federal offense to which the Second Circuit applied
federal law. Had the Second Circuit applied New York State
law to the seizure,"3 as Scopo argued it should have, it might
have reached a different result. Under New York State law
"police may not use a mere pretext to investigate the defendant
on an unrelated matter."'36 In contrast to the Second Circuit,
"o Government Brief, supra note 117, at 26. Included in this "Wealth of stan.
dards" perhaps is the manner in which an arrest is carried out. That was not at
issue in Scopo.
- See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155 and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1)(a),
supra note 98. But see supra note 77, discussing Scopo's argument that New York
state courts have effectively limited the circumstances under which arrests may be
made for violations of the New York Vehicle & Traffic Law.
" Defendant Appellant's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing
In Banc at 11, United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.) (No. 93-1201), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994) ("[the existence of probable cause for a minor traffic
violation ... does not sufficiently answer the concerns of unbridled police arbi-
trariness.") [hereinafter "Petition for Rehearing"].
" See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
124 Government Brief, supra note 117, at 26.
' See supra note 77 for a discussion of the applicability of federal as opposed
to state suppression law.




when the issue of pretext is raised New York State courts
examine all of the circumstances surrounding an arrest and
determine whether the arrest was made because of the traffic
violation or because the police were interested in investigating
other criminal activity." In Scopo's case, the district court
found that the facts and circumstances established a
pretextual arrest, and this finding was not disputed by the
Second Circuit.
These differences between state and federal law lead to
significantly different results for New York defendants depend-
ing on whether their case is tried in state or federal court. One
of the effects of the Scopo decision is that prosecutors in New
York State have every incentive to avoid bringing charges in
state court, opting instead, where possible, to bring those
charges in federal court-where the issue of pretext will inevi-
tably be resolved in their favor.s Thus, the effectiveness of
New York State pretext law, and the protection it was de-
signed to provide against capricious search practices, is under-
mined in favor of the far less stringent federal pretext law.
" Id. (court finds that illegal U-tura was clearly a pretext to stop vehicle
where officer testified that he followed vehicle because he thought defendant was
in possession of drugs, and failed to issue summons or to ask driver for license
and registration); see also, People v. Letts, 180 A.D.2d 931, 934, 580 N.Y.S.2d 525,
527-28 (3d Dept 1992) (court finds that failure to come to complete stop was
"mere pretex" to search car for narcotics where officers had been surveilling de-
fendant based on anonymous tip and had waited until defendant proceeded six
miles after infraction to make stop); People v. Vasquez, 173 A.D.24 580, 581, 570
N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (2d Dep't 1991) (court finds double-parking violation "mere pre-
text" to approach vehicle and order occupants out where officer testified that he
was not interested in issuing summons but was interested in investigating suspi-
cious vehicle); People v. Flanagan, 56 A.D.2d 658, 660, 391 N.YS.2d 907, 909 (2d
Dep't 1977) (court finds stop of vehicle for previously observed double-parking
violation "mere pretext" to search vehicle where officers were members of anti-
crime unit, were not assigned to traffic duty and were patrolling in high crime
area).
"' As Scopo pointed out, "New York City detectives are now encouraged to
disregard the rules and standards of the New York State Courts concerning vehi-
cle stops, since they may now bring the fruits of any arbitrary pretextual searches
to the district courts of this Circuit. In effect, the district courts of this circuit
may now become the local traffic courts of choice for the police officers of New
York City.7 Petition for Rehearing, supra note 132, at 14.
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C. Policy Concerns Underlying the Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit based its opinion, in part, on extra-
constitutional policy concerns.139 Unfortunately, the Scopo
court failed to explain why only the could have test adequately
addresses these concerns. In fact, although at first glance these
policy justifications exihibit a certain symmetry and common-
sense appeal, and illustrate the neatness and efficiency of the
could have test, on further examination they prove largely to
be either without merit or unrelated to the concerns addressed
by pretext doctrine.
The Scopo court expressed concern that application of the
would have test subjects the validity of a traffic stop or arrest
to "the vagaries of police departments' policies and proce-
dures."14 This argument assumes that the only element
courts consider when examining a pretext claim is whether the
initial stop constituted a deviation from standard policy and
procedure. Most courts that apply the would have test, howev-
er, consider additional elements.' For instance, while the
district court in Scopo found significance in the Strike Force
members' failure to stop Scopo immediately after they wit-
nessed the first traffic infraction-despite the fact that this is
standard practice'--it did not limit its review to that single
finding.4 3
The court's rationale fails to recognize that the would have
test does not begin and end with a finding of a deviation from
standard practice. While it may be impractical to require police
" The Sixth Circuit previously articulated these same policy concerns in United
States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 97 (1994).
"0 Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784 (citing Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392).
"4 See, e.g., Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 304-05 (factors pointing to pretext include
prior surveillance of suspect, failure to issue a citation for infraction witnessed
earlier by same officer and knowledge on part of arresting officers that traffic
infractions used in past to justify gun searches); Ferguson, 989 F.2d at 205 (fac-
tors pointing to pretext include prior surveillance of suspect and pursuit of suspect
prior to witnessing traffic infraction); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 705,
707 (11th Cir. 1986) (factors pointing to pretext include presence of DEA agent in
police car and reliance on drug courier profile).
1 Scopo, 814 F. Supp. at 304.
13 For a discussion of other factors considered by the district court see supra
notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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officers to know the standard policy for every traffic infraction,
and burdensome to require courts to make searching inquiries
regarding those policies, the would have test does not implicate
such concerns to the degree suggested by the Second Circuit.
Departmental policies are merely one element in the factual
mix considered by courts applying the test. '
The Scopo court next noted its concern that the would
have test insulates "persons involved in criminal activities
from 'criminal liability for those activities simply because a
judge determines that the police officer who executed the traf-
fic stop... would not have stopped them for the traffic offense
that they in fact committed.'"" '45 The would have test, like any
other review resulting in exclusion of evidence, insulates a
certain amount of criminal activity, because an unconstitution-
al seizure precludes use at trial of direct evidence obtained as
a result of that seizure. The Second Circuit's observation is not
novel. It has long been recognized that an unfortunate conse-
quence of affording fourth amendment protections to both
guilty and innocent alike is that the guilty will at times be
insulated from liability for their criminal activity."'6 Adoption
of the would have test ensures that the innocent will be afford-
ed the same protections.
In this respect, the Second Circuit appears to criticize
exclusionary practice in general. But this approach fails to
answer the threshold question in pretextual arrest cas-
es-whether the initial seizure is constitutional. If it is not,
then the incriminating evidence discovered as a result of the
fourth amendment violation cannot bootstrap the illegal sei-
zure.
The third benefit of the could have test as enumerated by
the court is that 'law enforcement officials [have] the freedom
to enforce violations of the law-even minor ones-when they
4' The Second Circuils argument is more accurately a general criticism of Pro-
fessor LaFave's "standard police practices" approach rather than a criticism of the
would have test. For a discussion of Professor LaFave's approach see supra note
119.
'" Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784 (citing United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392)
(6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994).
"" See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowit2, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ('It is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been
forged in controversies involving not very nice people.') (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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actually view violations."147 Certainly, any approach that sub-
stantially limits enforcement of traffic safety laws arouses
concern. This argument, however, is flawed in that it assumes
that any other approach, including the would have test, pre-
cludes enforcement. This simply is not the case. Functionally,
the would have test operates to exclude evidence of a more
serious crime that police discover as a result of a pretextual
arrest. It does not straitjacket police officers in their efforts to
enforce traffic laws. 14 The concern expressed by courts that
adopt a would have test relates not to issuance of the traffic
citation, but to the ensuing search and the officer's reasons for
conducting it. Practically speaking, police officers might not
expend the effort to enforce minor traffic violations absent the
prospect of conducting a search. Nonetheless, under either test,
they are still free to do so. Eliminating the search incentive is
not tantamount to barring the issuance of traffic tickets.
Lastly, the Second Circuit suggested that the would have
test permits courts to usurp the legislative law-making func-
tion. Conversely, the could have test, according to the court,
has the benefit of ensuring that "'courts leave to the legisla-
tures the job of determining what traffic laws police officers
are authorized to enforce and when they are authorized to
enforce them." 49
The legislature has a paramount interest in fashioning the
most efficient and effective means to implement its laws.
Courts lack sufficient resources and expertise to assume this
role. 50 Lawmakers may find sound reasons to permit custodi-
I Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784.
"" See, e.g., Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 397 ("Even in the most egregious case of pre-
text, ... the citizen can be issued the citation for [the] traffic violation.") (Jones,
J., dissenting); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988)
("Contrary to the Government's argument, [a reasonable officer] approach will not
severely curtail the ability of the [plolice to enforce traffic laws. No prosecution for
violation of a traffic [safety] regulation will be affected. Police officers may always
issue appropriate citations to drivers who violate traffic regulations.") (citation
omitted). But see Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 395 ("Of course, not every minor violation of
traffic regulations justifies a stop .... The appropriate inquiry ... is whether the
traffic violation is one that is so minor ... that the reasonable officer would not
have stopped an unsuspicious car, or whether the stop was for a reason that
would have let a reasonable officer to make the stop under any circumstances.")
(Keith, J., dissenting).
" Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784 (quoting Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392).
"' The Supreme Court has noted that the decision of how best to enforce traffic
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al arrests for all traffic violations. For example, arrest policies
incrementally tied to the "seriousness" of every conceivable
type of violation pose institutional and definitional difficulties.
Whether a traffic offense warrants an arrest may vary accord-
ing to how many miles a driver exceeds the speed limit, wheth-
er the traffic violation occurs in a populous area, and other
innumerable factors. A coherent policy based on these vari-
ables, that can be applied with any degree of certainty by po-
lice officers in the field, may be impossible to develop.
The court's concern, however, again appears to be based on
the erroneous assumption that the would have test prevents
enforcement of laws that the legislature has decided should be
enforced. But the would have test does not presume that ar-
rests for traffic violations are per se unconstitutional. Ulti-
mately, the court's reliance on this rationale simply begs the
question of the constitutionality of pretextual arrests. While
legislatures are empowered to decide the most appropriate
means for enforcing laws, courts are "entrusted with [duties]
as guardians of the Bill of Rights to apply limitations upon the
legislature's power."'51 Legislative mandates cannot insulate
police conduct from constitutional review. Unfortunately, the
type of judicial restraint espoused by the Second Circuit in
Scopo undermines the basic judicial function of reviewing
constitutionally infirm conduct.
Simply put, the concerns expressed by the court do not
support institution of the could have test. Nor do Chief Judge
Newman's assurances that the test will not be abused because
police will be deterred by the prospect of liability for selective
enforcement withstand close scrutiny.
laws should be left to politically accountable branches of government. See, e.g.,
Michigan State Dept of Police v. Sitz, 490 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) (prior fourth
amendment precedent "not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials
to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforce-
ment techniques should be employed... Mhe choice among... reasonable
alternatives remains with the government officials who have a unique understand-
ing of; and responsibility for, limited public resource?).
" United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 398 (6th Cir. 1993) (on banc) (Jones,
J., disseiting), cert. denfed, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994)
19951
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
D. The Effectiveness of a Selective-Enforcement Remedy: The
Scopo Concurrence
Chief Judge Newman wrote separately to address the risk
posed in permitting pretextual arrests. He stated the concern
that
some police officers will use the pretext of traffic violations or other
minor infractions to harass members of groups identified by factors
that are totally impermissible as a basis for law enforcement activi-
ty-factors such as race or ethnic origin, or simply appearances that
police officers do not like, such as young men with long hair, heavy
jewelry or flashy clothing."2
Chief Judge Newman proposed that such abuses could be ade-
quately curbed by civil selective-enforcement lawsuits award-
ing monetary damages to the victims of such practices.153
A selective-enforcement remedy is appealing because it
permits introduction of incriminating evidence at a criminal
trial while providing a remedy for violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights. Yet, because of the stringent legal stan-
dards for establishing a claim and the practical improbability
of prevailing on the merits, the effectiveness of this remedy is
questionable.
1. The Legal Standards for Establishing a Prima Facie
Claim of Selective Enforcement
A selective-enforcement claim does not attack the merits of
a case. Rather, it challenges the fact that police have enforced
a law against one person and have not enforced that same law
against others "who appear to be equally culpable and appre-
hensible."" Selective-enforcement and selective-prosecution
claims... arise under the equal protection clause of the Four-
12 Scopo, 19 F.3d at 785-86 (Newman, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 786. Chief Judge Newman conceded that some discriminatory treat-
ment would likely escape detection, but he concluded that "the Equal Protection
Clause has sufficient viability to curb most of the abuses [that may occur]." Id.
"' Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1369 (1987).
"' Courts use the terms "selective enforcement" and "selective prosecution"
interchangeably to refer to the generic practice of unequal application of the laws
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teenth Amendment15 because discriminatory application of
the law amounts to a denial of equal justice." A claim of
selective enforcement may be raised as an affirmative defense
to a criminal chargese and may form the basis for a civil suit
for monetary damages or injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983.'I 9
by police, prosecutors and other public officials charged with enforcement of crimi-
nal and civil laws. See e.g., United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[t]hough selective prosecution, if based on improper motives, can vio-
late constitutional guarantees of equal protection, selective enforcement in and of
itself is not a constitutional violation") (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962)); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("assuming
that the defendant's evidence of selective enforcement somehow was sufficint....
[all that the defendant could point to in support of his claim was the general
danger [of] selective prosecution"); Lennon v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv,
527 F.2d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[a]lthough the Board rejected [defendant's] se-
lective enforcement defense.... ilt would be premature for us to be more specif-
ic, since the facts underlying (defendant's] claim of selective prosecution have not
been developed sufficiently for appellate review"); Perrotta v. Irizarry, 430 F. Supp.
1274, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[plaintiff alleges that the charges made against
him... constituted selective prosecution.... [hiowever, selective enforcement
does not in and of itself amount to a constitutional violation") (citing Oyfer, 368
U.S. at 456). As used in this Comment, "selective enforcement" refbrs to a police
officer's decision to enforce a particular law and not to the prosecutorial decision
to bring charges.
" The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
pertinent part that "[nlo state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
' See, eg., United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1992) (motion to
dismiss conviction for unlawful reentry into United States predicated on claim of
selective prosecution). In the Second Circuit, if the defense is not raied prior to
trial, it is waived. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Chief Judge Newman did not discuss the use of a selec-
tive enforcement claim as a defense in a criminal action. That aspect of selective
enforcement is relevant for present purposes because it is possible that a criminal
defendant such as Scopo may be collaterally estopped from bringing a post-convic-
tion § 1983 cause of action for selective prosecution if he or she fails to raise it as
an affirmative defense at the trial level See Green v. City of New York Medical




In Wayte v. United States,16 the Supreme Court held
that a selective-enforcement claim is judged according to "ordi-
nary equal protection standards" and requires a showing that
the practice of selective enforcement "[has] a discriminatory
effect and that it [is] motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose."'161 In United States v. Berris,"62 the Second Circuit
developed a two-pronged test for selective enforcement that re-
quires a defendant to establish prima facie:
(1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been
proceeded against because of the conduct of the type forming the
basis of the charge against him, he has been singled out for prose-
cution, and (2) that the government's discriminatory selection of him
for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon
such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to
prevent his exercise of a constitutional right."
Mere failure to prosecute other offenders does not suffice to es-
tablish a federal constitutional violation." Moreover, a plain-
tiff must present sufficient proof to meet both prongs of the
Berrios test. A failure to prove one prong will defeat the
claim. 65
A claimant meets the first prong of the test by showing
160 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
1"1 Id. at 608.
162 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 1211. Although in Berrios the selective enforcement claim was raised
as a defense to a criminal charge, the Second Circuit has applied the same two-
pronged test to civil claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., LeClair v.
Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609 (2d Cir. 1980) (liability for selective enforcement
claim brought pursuant to § 1983 for monetary damages depends on proof that
plaintiff was treated selectively compared with others similarly situated and that
selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, reli-
gion, or intent to punish or inhibit exercise of constitutional right); Contractors
Against Unfair Taxation Instituted on New Yorkers v. City of New York, No. 93
CIV. 4718, 1994 WL 455553, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994) (same).
, Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). Because it is likely that proof that
others have violated a particular law and have not been prosecuted could be of-
fered with respect to virtually every type of offense, permitting that fact alone to
sustain a claim of selective enforcement would seriously hinder the administration
of criminal justice. See, e.g., Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1963) ("[i]f
such facts alone were sufficient to make out a [selective enforcement claim] almost
every state prosecution would be subject to interference on the claim of discrimina-
tion and the offer of such proof).
165 See Saunders, 627 F.2d at 610 ("we need not decide whether appellees satis.
fied the first part of the test, since even assuming arguendo that they did, they
nevertheless failed to proffer sufficient evidence supporting the second").
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that the discriminatory treatment was purposeful and system-
atic. This showing is made "by specifying instances in which
the plaintiff was singled out for unlawful oppression in con-
trast to others similarly situated."" Conclusory allegations
of selective treatment are insufficient to meet the first
prong,67 as are allegations that enforcement is not rou-
tine.16s
Even if a claimant successfully shows that the selective-
enforcement practice had a discriminatory effect or result, thus
satisfying the first prong of Berrios, he or she must also show
that a discriminatory purpose motivated the decisionmaker
and that the decisionmaker intended the discriminatory
result.'69 Establishing discriminatory purpose requires proof
that the police officer made the decision, at least in part, be-
cause of its adverse effect on an identifiable groupY Wheth-
er the impermissible motivation must be the sole or dominant
factor in the decision to enforce, a lesser "but for" cause, or
only one of a number of reasons for the decision is unclear.""
," Contractors Against Unfair Taxation, 1994 WL 455553 at 6.
, Id. It is not clear whether this prong requires a showing only that the law
was not enforced against other violators, or whether it requires an additional
showing that the government was generally or specifically aware of this practice.
Reiss, supra note 154 at 1371 n.18.
"~ See, eg., United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1992) (where
defendant contended that he was only one of two people prosecuted under particu-
lar law during year-long period, and prosecution presented evidence that it had
prosecuted 13 other like claims during three-year period, court finds that fact that
such prosecutions were not routine insufficient to meet first prong); United States
v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229-1230 (2d Cir. 1983) (showing that four others had
not been prosecuted for tax evasion fhils to meet first prong without showing that
others were similarly situated); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1209-11
(2d Cir. 1974) (affidavit based on belief that only three prosecutions had been
conducted in prior five years insufficient to meet first prong); Contractors Against
Unfair Taxation, 1994 WL 455553 at *6 (allegation in complaint that traffic laws
more rigorously enforced against commercial vehicle owners insufficient to meet
first prong where plaintiffs failed to cite specific instances in which they were
singled out for disparate treatment and failed to allege facts in support of allega-
tion that noncommercial vehicle owners treated differently).
"' Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985); Moon, 718 F.2d at
1230.
170 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 609. Scopo's claim, which would be that he was targeted
for enforcement because of his alleged involvement in organized crime, would fail
on this prong. As the government noted, "[a] desire to quell a violent conflict with-
in an organized crime family that has resulted in several murders is not the kind
of invidious purpose that the selective prosecution doctrine proscribes.r Government
Brief, supra note 117, at 7.
171 Reiss, supra note 154, at 1372 n.25 (citing authorities). Regardless of the
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In challenges to enforcement of traffic laws, the burden of
meeting the first prong of Berrios is significant. First, it is un-
likely that a claimant could offer proof of specific instances of
relevant standard, it is unlikely that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstanc-
es, a court would find against an arresting officer with respect to intent. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Harvey, 788 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 16
F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1993), petition for rehg denied, 24 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 258 (1994), police stopped a vehicle with equipment viola-
tions that was exceeding the speed limit by several miles per hour. Id. at 967-68.
The driver was arrested after police confirmed that he was unlicensed. Id. at 968.
During a pat-down search, the police discovered crack cocaine. One of the officers
conducted an inventory search of the car incident to the arrest and retrieved co-
caine and guns from the trunk. Id. Harvey made a pretrial motion to suppress the
evidence as the fruit of a pretextual arrest. Id. at 969. At the hearing on the
motion, the following testimony was elicited from one of the arresting officers:
Q: Officer Collardey, you gave the Prosecutor two reasons for your ef-
fecting a traffic stop. One was the traffic infraction, speeding, and
the equipment violation[s], and then you referred to something that
I hadn't heard yet today, that was, fitting a general description of
some sort of profile?
A: It did, yeah, it did fit. . . . I made that statement on the basis of
my experience on that highway, and drug traffickers that I have
arrested coming to [that] area.
Q: What else was it that made you think [that this automobile] fitl
some sort of profile?
A: There were three young black male occupants in an old vehicle.
Q: Three young black male occupants in a car?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was the basis or part of the basis for you stopping the
car?
A: The age of the vehicle and the appearance of the occupants.
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 37-38, Harvey (No. 90-80957).
Following this exchange, the court proceeded to question the witness further:
Q: What was it about the appearance of the occupants that got your at-
tention?
A: It wasn't so much the appearance. Almost every time that we have
arrested drug traffickers from Detroit, they're usually young black
males driving old cars.
Q: Was that why you stopped the car, or did you stop the car for traf-
fic violations?
A: I stopped them for traffic violations.
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, at 38-39.
Notwithstanding this testimony, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Harvey's conviction
for drug and gun possession. Judge Keith wrote a stinging dissent. He noted that
the reason the officer gave for stopping the vehicle was that it was an old car
containing three African American males. United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109,
113 (6th Cir.) (Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 258 (1994). He argued
that because the trial court knew of the true, and impermissible, reason for the
stop, 'the district judge improperly rehabilitated Officer Collardey's testimony,"
providing him with the appropriate response. Id.
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nonenforcement. Records of traffic citations show how often
traffic laws are enforced, but do not indicate how often viola-
tions are ignored. Even assuming that police departments kept
records of nonenforcement, the Second Circuit does not require
discovery in selective-enforcement cases unless a claimant has
made a prima facie showing as to both prongs of Berrios."
On the other hand, it is likely that the government could rebut
any purported showing of this kind because police issue traffic
citations on a regular basis.
Even if a plaintiff obtains records of nonenforcement, these
records may be insufficient to meet the second prong of
Berrios. Courts generally are unwilling to infer discriminatory
intent from nonenforcement statistics alone, 3 and further
evidence of intent is likely to be in the control of the police de-
partment. As discussed above, however, claimants have no
right to discovery in selective-enforcement claims absent a
prima facie showing that the two prongs of Berrios have been
met. One commentator has noted that a claimant seeking to
raise a selective enforcement claim is "placed in a Catch-22
type bind [because] she cannot obtain discovery unless she first
makes a threshold showing [and] making a sufficient prelimi-
nary showing... may be impossible without some discov-
ery." 74 Thus, because of both the lack of documentary evi-
dence indicating nonenforcement and the difficulty of obtaining
discovery of evidence in the Second Circuit, in order to succeed
on a claim of selective enforcement, a claimant may ironically
be forced to rely on the testimony of the arresting officer in
order to succeed on a claim of selective enforcement.
175
12 Moon, 718 F.2d at 1229; see also Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211-10 (prior to per-
mitting discovery of governments records to support claim of selective prosecution
"we would first require some evidence tending to show the existence of the essen-
tial elements of the defense and that the documents in the government's posses-
sion would indeed be probative of these elements").
"' Reiss, supra note 154, at 1373 (citing 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL
PROCEDURE § 13.2 (1984) and Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the
Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659,
693 (1981)). Even if records of traffic citations were generally available, they would
be of little help in proving the second prong of the Berries test. Traffic tickets do
not indicate the race or ethnicity of the person ticketed. Thus, they would not
prove that members of particular groups are disproportionately singled out as
targets for enforcement of traffic laws.
174 Reiss, supra note 154, at 1373-74.
175 Police are not likely to be forthcoming with testimony confirming illicit moti-
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2. Disincentives To Bringing a Selective-Enforcement
Lawsuit
In addition to the difficulty of establishing the legal suffi-
ciency of a selective-enforcement claim, practicalities mitigate
against the likelihood of success on the merits. First, a jury is
unlikely to award significant damages to a claimant convicted
of a crime. Even with a statutory floor guaranteeing a mini-
mum recovery, a finding of liability is necessary, and requires
some empathy for the claimant.17 Second, it is questionable
whether monetary damages adequately compensate a person
incarcerated as a result of selective enforcement. Finally, with
respect to a defendant who has been convicted on the basis of
evidence obtained as a result of a selective enforcement, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel might prevent institution of an
action under section 1983.177
vation. In his dissent in Harvey, Judge Keith noted that in his 26 years as a
federal judge "although I have suspected discrimination by police officers, I have
never heard an officer admit he stopped an individual based on the color of his
skin." 16 F.3d at 114 (Keith, J., dissenting). Ironically, in Harvey, the police officer
testified that he stopped the car for a reason that can legitimately be construed as
an improper one. See supra note 171. Regardless, the defendant's motion to sup-
press in that case was denied. In the civil context, due to the stringent burden of
proof placed on the claimant, it is unlikely that many selective-enforcement claims
would survive a motion for summary judgment.
17 Cf. Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (1955) (discussing difficulties in successfully prosecuting
actions against police when claimants are "marginal types," such as convicted
criminals). Even with respect to otherwise law-abiding citizens, it is unclear that a
relatively brief roadside stop would lead to a monetary award substantially large
enough to justify the expense of litigation.
"' Chief Judge Newman's selective-enforcement remedy fails to address some
subtle and difficult issues with respect to convicted criminals who are victims of
selective enforcement. For example, a guilty plea to the underlying charges in a
criminal action will generally not preclude a litigant in a § 1983 action from rais-
ing a claim of selective enforcement because the issue of selective enforcement will
not be litigated at the trial level. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 318 (1983). It
is possible, however, that a defendant who raises an affirmative defense of selec-
tive enforcement at her criminal trial and is convicted may be estopped from pur-
suing that claim in an action for money damages. In such instances, by definition,
the trier of fact must necessarily consider, and reject, the defense of selective
enforcement. Moreover, at least one court in the Second Circuit has refused to
permit a convicted claimant to raise a claim of selective enforcement under § 1983
where the issue was not raised at the trial court level. Green v. City of New York
Medical Examiner's Office, 723 F. Supp. 973, 975-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Finally, the
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IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PRETEXT
Alternative approaches to pretext could both operate to
deter arbitrary arrest practices and ensure that courts
meaningfully review pretextual arrests. Deterrence could be
accomplished by removing the incentive for police to make
such arrests, either by limiting the scope of the search that
may be made incident to traffic offense arrests or by limiting
the authority to make arrests for certain infractions. In the
alternative, adequate review of police practice would result if
courts are permitted to examine and weigh the objective facts
surrounding the arrest, even when those facts implicate the
intent of the arresting officer.
A. Limiting the Scope of Searches Incident to Traffic
Offense Arrests: Belton Revisited
Pretextual traffic arrests are proof that the Belton bright
line has dimmed. The bright line fails in this situation because
it does not provide a balance between the state's dual interests
in enforcing of traffic laws and ensuring police safety and
citizens' interest in remaining free from intrusive searches
resulting from arrests for minor traffic infractions. Courts
strike a proper balance between these interests when they
tailor search and seizure powers to the interests they purport-
edly serve. Yet the Belton bright line clearly shifts the balance
in favor of the police. The state's interests can be adequately
ensured by a less intrusive search rule.
Searches incident to arrest protect police officers and en-
sure the preservation of evidence. Because arrests for minor
traffic violations implicate only one of these concerns-the
safety of the police officer-application of the Belton rule in
this context is unnecessary. Probable cause to arrest for a non-
Supreme Court has held that a person currently incarcerated cannot pursue a
claim for damages based on an alleged violation of his constitutional rights leading
to the fact of incarceration. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (holding
that state prisoner who brings § 1983 claim that questions the lavfulnes3 of incar-
ceration based on constitutional violation must prove that sentence has been inval-
idated in order to prevail, and that absent such showing the claim is not cogniza-
ble under § 1983).
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evidentiary crime does not warrant search powers that address
the need to preserve evidence. A scope limitation that provides
adequate protection to the police officer sufficiently addresses
that concern in such cases.
178
Although a scope limitation for non-evidentiary crimes is a
radical departure from the Belton bright line, it does not radi-
cally depart from the Belton rationale. First, in Belton, police
arrested the occupants of the automobile for possession of
marijuana prior to searching the car.1 9 The search of the car
therefore was justified on evidentiary grounds. Traffic offenses
implicate no such evidentiary concerns because, by definition,
there is no tangible evidence of the offense. Second, in
Michigan v. Long, 80 a post-Belton decision, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that the Belton rule is justified in
large part by the need to preserve evidence.
In Long, the Court permitted a warrantless search of an
automobile based on reasonable suspicion that the driver was
armed.18' Although the officers had probable cause to arrest
Long for driving under the influence, they failed to do so before
conducting the search.'82 The Court distinguished the ratio-
nale that permits automobile searches incident to arrest
(where the police have probable cause to believe that the driver
has committed a crime) from the rationale that permits such
178 Lower courts could define the contours of such a scope limitation. At a mini-
mum, police arresting for a non-evidentiary crime would be permitted to remove
occupants from the car and search their persons fully, in accord with United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), discussed supra part IA.1. However, once
police have taken steps to protect their safety adequately, no further search would
be permissible. A prophylactic bar against automobile searches under these circum-
stances could be balanced against a need for a further search on a case-by-case
basis. A rebuttable presumption that a search of the automobile is unreasonable
under these circumstances would ensure that police would not have an incentive
to circumvent the rule.
", New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
180 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
181 Id. at 1048. Investigatory stops, as opposed to full arrests, are supported by
"reasonable suspicion," a standard less stringent than probable cause. Because at
times a legitimate need exists for law enforcement officers to investigate criminal
activity before probable cause to make an arrest has arisen, the Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), recognized a limited class of intrusions commonly
referred to as "stop and frisks" which may be made upon reasonable suspicion
that a person is engaged in criminal activity and that the person is armed. Id. at
30.
"Long, 463 U.S. at 1035 n.1.
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searches incident to investigatory stops (where police have
reasonable suspicion that the driver is armed):
We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may con-
duct automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative
stop, although the 'bright line' that we drew in Belton dearly autho-
rizes such a search whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An
additional interest exists in the arrest context, ie., preservation of
evidence, and this justifies an 'automatic'search. However that addi-
tional interest does not exist [in this case]... because the interest in
collecting and preserving evidence is not present... we require that
officers who conduct area searches during investigative stops must
do so only when they have the level of suspicion identified in Ter-
ry. 8
3
Thus, while explicitly reaffirming the Belton rule, the Long
Court suggested that the evidentiary rationale of Belton does
not apply where there is no evidence to be preserved.
Third, a bright-line rule prohibiting searches of automo-
biles incident to arrests for non-evidentiary crimes is as easily
applied by the officer in the field as a bright-line rule that per-
mits such searches. Therefore, such a scope limitation does not
undermine the Court's concern in Belton for workable defini-
tions of the scope of the search.1" The limitation also ad-
dresses the Court's concern over the inherent danger of auto-
mobile stops by permitting searches aimed at protecting the
officer.ss
Finally, a scope limitation conveys society's disapproval of
pretextual arrests in a more effective manner than vitiating
otherwise lawful conduct on the basis of the officer's state of
mind. One commentator has observed that:
[lt is strange to instruct police officers that they act improperly
when, for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence, they act
within the boundaries of a recognized exception to the warrant re-
Id. at 1049-50 n.4 (emphasis added).
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam)
("we... specifically recognize the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile"); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 234 & 3L5 (1973) ("Nor are we inclined ... to qualify the breadth of
the general authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest on the as-
sumption that persons arrested for [traffic offenses] are less likely to possess dan-
gerous weapons.... The danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the
arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for the arrest.").
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quirement. If an ordinary citizen acts within the boundaries of a
statute to achieve ends not contemplated by the statute, we do not
criticize the citizen. We may congratulate the citizen for his or her
creativity. Or, if we consider the citizen's conduct to constitute an
abuse, we demand that legislators rewrite the statute to eliminate
the possibility of abuse.1"
This limitation on police search authority will not resolve the
problem of pretextual police activity entirely. Police may still
stop an automobile to gather plain-view evidence or to search
the driver. In some instances, police might even arrest in order
to impound and conduct an inventory search of a vehicle. That
option might have been attractive to the Strike Force mem-
bers, who had prior knowledge of Scopo's involvment in orga-
nized crime and had reason to believe that violence was im-
pending. In most instances, however, police will lack such prior
knowledge and the authorization to impound and inventory a
vehicle will not provide the degree of incentive to arrest pro-
vided by an immediate on-the-scene search. Additionally, the
intrusion that occurs when police stop an automobile is
negligible compared with the intrusion that occurs when the
occupant is arrested and the car fully searched.
B. Limiting the Right to Arrest for Minor Traffic
Violations: A Fourth Amendment Balancing Approach
One commentator suggests an alternative approach for
curbing pretext: stringently limit the circumstances under
which police may make an arrest for a traffic violation.8"'
Balancing the intrusion on the driver's liberty against the state
interests served by permitting arrests for traffic infractions,
arrests for traffic offenses are patently unreasonable in almost
all situations."
... Haddad, supra note 2, at 691-92.
... Salken, supra note 43, at 273.
" The Supreme Court has not passed on the question of whether arrests for
traffic infractions are per se unreasonable, but members of the Court have indicat-
ed that they are. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 450 n.11 (1981) ("a
police officer's authority to restrain an individual's liberty should be limited in the
context of stops for routine traffic violations") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennsylva-
nia v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 122 n.11 (1977) ("I assume . . . that [driving an
automobile without a license plate] would not have warranted a full custodial
arrest without some additional justification.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gustafson v.
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An arrest for a traffic offense seriously intrudes on the
driver's liberty. Among other indignities suffered during the
arrest process are loss of freedom of movement, booking, fin-
gerprinting, and a search of the traffic offender and his vehi-
cle.189 On the other side of the scale are the state interests in
enforcing traffic laws. Although weighty, the state interests are
insufficient to support full-blown arrests because they can be
served by far less intrusive means. The purpose of motor vehi-
cle laws is to ensure safety on the roads and highways. For
several reasons, an arrest is not necessary to accomplish this
goal.
The primary governmental interests served by any cus-
todial arrest are insuring that the suspect will be present to
answer charges brought against him or her, preventing future
harm, and obtaining evidence of the crime of which the suspect
is accused.190 The interest in preventing future harm is rarely
present in the case of a motor vehicle infraction. Presumably a
driver who acts recklessly once may do so again in the future.
When police give a citation in lieu of an arrest (which is the
more frequent course of action), the driver is permitted to get
back in her car and drive away. Yet, the state's interest in
safety is no better served by arresting the driver because the
arrested offender will be released after posting bail and still
will get into her car and drive away.19' The only offense that
poses a danger to others sufficient to warrant an arrest is
driving while intoxicated.'92
Identifying the suspect is a crucial step in securing ap-
pearance at future proceedings, but an arrest is not necessary
to accomplish this goal so long as the driver can be identified
through license and registration.'93 Moreover, the seriousness
of the crime is directly related to the probability of appearance.
Generally, the less serious the offense and anticipated punish-
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (It seems to me that a perauasive claim
might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a
minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.") (Stewart, J., concurring).
2S Salken, supra note 43 at 264.
19 Salken, supra note 43, at 266 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECI-
SION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 177-82; 186-89; 193-95 (1965)).
" Salken, supra note 43 at 270.
"' Salken, supra note 43, at 271.
"' Salken, supra note 43, at 268.
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ment, the more likely that the suspect will appear.' The on-
ly circumstance where future appearance warrants an arrest is
where the driver lacks identification.
In short, notwithstanding the existence of probable cause,
a full-blown arrest for a traffic offense is unreasonable because
the quality of the intrusion is not justified under the circum-
stances. Balancing the state interest served by the intrusion
against the individual's liberty interest, arrests are justified
only where the driver is intoxicated or has no identifica-
tion.'95 In all other instances, the state interest in road safety
is ensured equally through the issuance of a citation.'96
C. Limiting the Application of the Scott Trilogy
Broad application of the Scott trilogy to pretextual traffic-
offense arrests presupposes that the Supreme Court has held
that a finding of pretext is not possible because it requires
inquiry into intent. Assuming that the Court's concern with
pretext retains vitality, the Scott language can and should be
read more narrowly when dealing with questions of pretext. In
these circumstances, Scott should limit direct inquiry into the
officer's intent,'97 but should not preclude a finding of pretext
where the facts inevitably lead in that direction even when
those facts implicate the officer's intent and ultimately lead to
the conclusion that the officer acted with a specific motivation.
In New York v. Quarles,9 ' the Supreme Court articulat-
ed a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda
" Salken, supra note 43, at 268.
Salken, supra note 43, at 273.
," Although limiting the authority to arrest for traffic offenses may curb
pretextual arrests effectively, it will not deter pretextual stops. Police officers still
have the authority to stop a vehicle after witnessing an infraction, and they may
choose to do so for illicit reasons. See supra, note 123. However, the state interest
in highway safety balanced against the minor intrusion that occurs when a driver
is pulled over militates in favor of permitting such stops at the officer's discretion.
Although the power to stop may be used arbitrarily in much the same way as the
power to arrest, realistically, only the most egregious pretextual stops can be pre-
vented.
" During the suppression hearing in Scopo, Judge Glasser sustained an objec-
tion by the prosecutor when Scopo's attorney directly asked one of the arresting
officers his motive in stopping Scopo's car. Transcript of Suppression Hearing,
supra note 67, at 71.
8 467 U.S. 649 (1983).
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warnings199 be given before a suspect's answers to police in-
terrogation may be admitted into evidence."0 In doing so, the
Court stressed that the facts of a given situation determine
whether questioning is warranted by a legitimate concern for
public safety.0 1 The subjective motivations of the officer
questioning the suspect have no bearing on whether or not
public safety is implicated, even though one of those motiva-
tions may be the desire to obtain incriminating evidence.'
The Quarles analysis is equally applicable to pretextual
arrests: the officer's subjective intent to search a car is not
determinative of whether a pretextual arrest has occurred.
What is determinative are facts that objectively indicate or
negate pretext. An analysis that precludes consideration of
facts that strongly suggest pretext merely because they also
implicate intent is illogical. It forces courts to ignore the very
facts that are most helpful in making a finding of pretext and
places the "Constitution [at war with] common sense."'
CONCLUSION
Pretextual police conduct raises unique problems and
concerns not adequately addressed by a Scott analysis. By
limiting its analysis of pretext to the strictures of the Scott
trilogy's objective reasonableness standard, the Second Circuit
in Scopo failed to enunciate a standard of review that provides
any measure of protection against arbitrary, pretextual police
conduct. Therefore, the Second Circuit and other courts should
approach the problem by applying fourth amendment analyses
that do more than validate a practice that values enforcement
of traffic laws and the satisfaction of police officers' hunches
above a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Laurie A. Buckenberger
"' In Afiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that certain
warnings must be given to persons in custody prior to questioning by police.
"' Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56.
2" Id. at 655-56.
21 Id. at 656.
M1 lapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) ("[tihere is no war between the
Constitution and common sense").
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